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1 Introduction
Nearly every economic decision people make entails some tradeoff through time, whether it is
consumption versus savings, doing a task now or later, building human capital, or investing
in one’s career. Characterizing such choices with structural models of discounting has been
a core challenge for economists for much of the last century, with important contributions by
Samuelson (1937); Koopmans (1960); Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001). The
preference parameters governing such models are of unique value for understanding a broad
range of behaviors, and so have received a great deal of attention in the empirical literature on
intertemporal choice.1
This paper seeks to understand whether the out-of-sample predictions given by structural
estimates of discounting are empirically valid. We conduct a field experiment on workers’
allocation of effort through time, a decision where evidence suggests that present-biased models
of decision-making may be particularly relevant.2 We first estimate the individual discounting
parameters of our workers, and then use these estimates to customize each worker’s contract
to their identified preferences with the intent of reaching a specific intertemporal pattern of
work. That is, we tailor incentives within-subject with the objective of reaching a predicted
out-of-sample target. Our core test of predictive validity compares tailored workers to a control
group which receives untailored, random contract terms.
Relatively little research makes use of the predictive value gained from the articulation and
estimation of structural models of discounting.3 When structural estimates or related measures
1 Examples include Hausman (1979); Lawrance (1991); Warner and Pleeter (2001); Cagetti (2003); Laibson,
Repetto and Tobacman (2005); Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011); Fang and Wang (2015); Harrison, Lau and Williams
(2002); Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008); Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a).
2For recent experimental examples, see Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan (2010, 2015); Augenblick, Niederle
and Sprenger (2015); Carvalho, Meier and Wang (2014) and Augenblick and Rabin (2015).
3What structural models have been used for is for comparison to market interest rates (Hausman, 1979), for
comparison across samples, time, or elicitation and estimation strategies (Coller and Williams, 1999; Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002; Meier and Sprenger, 2015; Andersen et al., 2008), to assess differences in
patience across subpopulations (Kirby, Petry and Bickel, 1999; Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 2010; Harrison
et al., 2002; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde, 2010; Lawrance, 1991; Warner and Pleeter, 2001), to conduct
welfare analyses (Laibson, 1997), and to conduct standard counterfactual exercises without out-of-sample testing
(e.g., for how price changes should alter demand (Mahajan and Tarozzi, 2011)).
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3are used in out-of-sample prediction exercises, the analysis has often been indirect, linking dif-
ferences in measured patience to differences in other behaviors without an articulated model
for the precise relationship between the two (Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt and Taubin-
sky, 2008b; Meier and Sprenger, 2008, 2012, 2010; Ashraf, Karlan and Yin, 2006; Dohmen,
Falk, Huffman and Sunde, 2006; Castillo, Ferraro, Jordan and Petrie, 2011).4 Though such
correlational exercises yield valuable insights, they could potentially be made more powerful by
directly employing the theoretical parameters in developing the out-of-sample prediction.5
Our project engages government health workers—termed Lady Health Workers (LHWs)—
associated with polio eradication efforts for the Department of Health in Lahore, Pakistan.
Polio is endemic in Pakistan. Of 350 new worldwide cases in 2014, 297 occurred in Pakistan,
constituting a ‘global public health emergency’ according to the World Health Organization.6
The disease largely affects children under five. The function of LHW vaccinators is to provide
oral polio vaccine to children during government organized vaccination drives, which usually
last two or more days and are conducted approximately every month. Vaccinators are given
a supply of oral vaccine and a neighborhood map, and are asked to travel door-to-door vac-
cinating children with a suggested target for vaccinations. Prior to our project there was no
technology for monitoring vaccinators, and achievement was self reported. As one might imag-
ine, vaccinators often fell short of their suggested targets, but rarely reported doing so. This
behavior is consistent with the large literature on public sector absenteeism (Banerjee and Du-
flo, 2006; Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster, 2008; Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan
and Rogers, 2006; Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain and Khan, 2015).
4One exception is Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) who use monetary measures for time inconsistency and
purchase and treatment decisions for insecticide treated bednets together to estimate the extent of present
bias and ‘sophistication’ thereof. This exercise can be thought of as articulating the relationship between the
experimental measures of time inconsistency and contract choice to deliver estimates of present bias. One point
noted by Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) is that the experimental measures wind up having limited predictive
power for estimates of present bias that result from their structural exercise.
5Indeed, such exercises could by-and-large be conducted without appeal to structural estimation. Linking
either non-parametric measures of discounting or structural parameters thereof to other behavior yields largely
the same correlational insights if one does not articulate precisely how how the structural parameters should
predict behavior.
6Between 95 percent and 99 percent of individuals carrying polio are asymptomatic. One infection is therefore
enough to indicate a substantial degree of ambient wild polio virus.
4Since our study requires implementing performance-based incentives, it hinges fundamen-
tally on an accurate measure of productivity.7 To this end, each vaccinator in our sample
is provided a smartphone, equipped with a precise real-time reporting application developed
expressly for this project.
Our tool for both measuring intertemporal preferences and tailoring intertemporal incentives
is a special bonus contract. In this contract, vaccinators set daily work targets, and, conditional
on reaching these targets, receive a sizable bonus. In particular, vaccinators set daily targets
of v1 and v2 vaccination attempts on day 1 and day 2 of the drive, respectively. Vaccinators
face an interest rate, R, such that a single vaccination that is allocated to day 2 reduces by R
the number of vaccinations required on day 1. That is, v1 and v2 satisfy the constraint
v1 +R · v2 = V,
where V = 300. The bonus contract offers a fixed bonus of 1000 rupees (10 times the daily
vaccinator wage) for meeting both of their v1 and v2 vaccination target attempts over a two-day
drive.8 If either daily target, v1 or v2, is not met, the bonus is not received. Following the
laboratory study of working over time conducted by Augenblick et al. (2015), our contracts are
the first field implementation of the Convex Time Budget (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a) for
eliciting intertemporal preferences using allocations of effort.
Chosen allocations, (v1, v2), can be used to structurally estimate discounting parameters for
vaccinators. Experimental variation permits identification of an important behavioral aspect of
intertemporal choice: the existence of present-biased preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue
7This links our work to a substantial body of recent research in development economics examining the
role of incentives and monitoring in improving public sector performance (Bertrand, Burgess, Chawla and Xu,
2016; Basinga, Gertler, Binagwaho, Soucat, Sturdy and Vermeesch, 2011; Miller, Luo, Zhang, Sylvia, Shi, Foo,
Zhao, Martorell, Medina and Rozelle, 2012; Olken, Onishi and Wong, 2014; Khan, Khwaja and Olken, 2015;
Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011).
8Our bonus program paid vaccinators for attempted rather than successful vaccinations to avoid concerns
that vaccinators, motivated by the incentives, would coerce individuals to receive vaccination. Details on the
incentive program are provided in Section 2.2. Slightly more than half of vaccination attempts are successful,
with slightly less than half of vaccination attempts reporting no child present. Appendix Figure A.7 reports
vaccination behavior for each half-hour of the study, demonstrating limited variation in the proportion of
successful and failed vaccination attempts throughout the work day.
5and Rabin, 1999). Vaccinators are randomly assigned to make their allocation decision either
in advance of the first day of the drive or immediately on day 1 itself. Additionally, vaccinators
are randomly assigned an interest rate, R. Under specific structural assumptions, the experi-
ment identifies a set of aggregate discounting parameters (for similar estimation strategies see
Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a; Augenblick et al., 2015). And, under additional assumptions,
each vaccinator’s allocation identifies her individual discount factor.
Unlike laboratory settings where sizable completion bonuses have been used to ensure near
one-hundred percent completion rates, in our field setting even a bonus of 10 times daily wages
does not ensure uniform completion.9 Roughly half of our subjects do not successfully complete
their chosen allocations. Such failure to complete has the potential to confound identification of
time preferences from experimental choice. Uncertainty alters the worker’s optimization prob-
lem, requiring them to balance their true preferences against the failure probabilities induced
by choice. Recognizing this issue and the likelihood that other field implementations of such
elicitation methods will likely face a similar challenge, we develop methodology to simultane-
ously estimate parameters related to preferences and failure probabilities. This methodology
can be used to generate not only out-of-sample predictions for allocation behavior, but also for
subsequent completion rates.10
We use the individual discounting parameters from an initial drive to predict behavior in
a follow-up drive. We couch our out-of-sample exercise in a policy experiment which tailors
9For college subjects Augenblick et al. (2015) employ bonuses $100 in their six-week study and achieve 88%
completion. In their follow-up work conditions they employ bonuses of $60 for a three week study and achieve
95% completion.
10The lack of uniform completion was not a feature of the data we initially expected, but, in retrospect,
is something we should have anticipated. Data from drives prior to our intervention showed that vaccinators
almost without exception hit their prescribed targets exactly. We believe these reports are at least partially
driven by the fact that polio is a politicized issue in Pakistan, with a number of stakeholders and international
donors being eager to demonstrate high numbers of vaccinations. Though we suspected prior data to reflect
some over-reporting, they did guide our choice, in collaboration with the Department of Health, of V = 300.
Indeed, the Department of Health was insistent that the target number of vaccinations not stray too far from
prior drive targets. In our initial drive, seventy-two vaccinators were provided with a phone alone and no
additional incentives for work, mimicking their standard work environment. Sixty vaccinators used the appli-
cation and completed an average of 203 vaccination attempts. Only twenty-four vaccinators recorded 300 or
more vaccination attempts in the drive. Given our lack of foresight, neither the functional forms estimated for
failure probabilities nor the implemented out-of-sample exercise predicting completion rates were in our study
registration. As such, they should be viewed with appropriate caveats.
6intertemporal incentives to worker time preferences. The tailoring policy we adopt is one
which uses the interest rate, R, to induce smooth allocation of vaccinations through time,
v1 = v2, for every vaccinator. The optimal choice under perfect completion is simple: to ensure
smooth allocation of service, the policy must give each vaccinator an interest rate equal to their
(appropriately defined) discount factor. Distance to the policy objective is compared between
a group of tailored vaccinators and a control group which receives random interest rates.11 Our
tailored policy makes vaccinators ‘pay’ for their impatience by facing a more severe interest
rate the more impatient they are, requiring more work in total. As such, it also generates out-
of-sample predictions for completion probabilities, with less patient vaccinators being predicted
to be more likely to fail under the tailored policy regime.
In a sample of 337 vaccinators, we document three principal findings. First, on aggregate,
a present bias exists in vaccination behavior. Vaccinators allocating in advance of day 1 of the
drive allocate significantly fewer vaccinations to v1 than those allocating on the morning the
drive actually commences. Corresponding estimates of present bias accord with those of prior
laboratory exercises with or without accounting for potential failure. Second, substantial het-
erogeneity in discounting is observed. This heterogeneity is important as it points to possible
gains from individually-tailored contracts. Third, tailored contracts work. Relative to random
contracts, vaccinators with tailored contracts provide significantly smoother service. More gen-
erally, the point predictions for behavior and completion rates out-of-sample are largely valid.
We are able to predict with accuracy not only individual choices under new contract terms,
but the probability with which they will complete the contract and the empirical relationships
between completion rates, contract terms, and preferences.
This paper makes four contributions. First, our exercise uses field behavior about effort
to examine non-standard time preferences, providing the first field operationalization of the
Augenblick et al. (2015) technique for measuring preferences.12 This joins a growing literature
11The policy objective we adopt is admittedly arbitrary. As the importance of the exercise is specifically in
examining point predictions for out-of-sample behavior, however, even our random interest rate treatment arm
possess the variation that can be used to assess the predictive validity of structural estimates.
12 Documenting dynamic inconsistency outside of the laboratory and outside of the standard experimental
7which identifies present bias from non-monetary choices in the field (Read and van Leeuwen,
1998; Sadoff, Samek and Sprenger, 2015; Read, Loewenstein and Kalyanaraman, 1999; Sayman
and Onculer, 2009; Kaur et al., 2010, 2015; Carvalho et al., 2014).13 As in prior research, our
results show that when investigating non-monetary choices, dynamic inconsistency may well
have empirical support.
Second, we develop a methodology to measure time preferences over work in settings where
task completion is not guaranteed, which is often the case in the field where managers set
ambitious targets for workers. This is certainly true in our case, where the government faced
massive international pressure to report successfully administering large numbers of polio vacci-
nations. Measuring preferences in these settings, therefore, requires allowing for the possibility
that workers do not meet their targets. More subtly, it may be that workers set their targets
with these considerations in mind. This could confound preference measures. The methodol-
ogy developed here to simultaneously estimate beliefs about completion and time preferences,
therefore, may be valuable to researchers conducting field elicitations of preference.
Third, we find that the predictions given by time preference estimates are accurate. There
is considerable debate regarding the value of measuring preferences. A substantial literature
argues for their usefulness by showing that preference measures correlate with economic behav-
ior. Our approach to evaluating the informativeness of measured preferences is to test whether
the specific point predictions they give for behavior are accurate. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper to do so.
The fourth contribution of our paper is to provide proof-of-concept that preference measures
can be used by principals to improve agents’ incentives.14 Much of the contract theory literature
domain of time dated monetary payments is particularly valuable given recent discussions on the elicitation
of present-biased preferences using potentially fungible monetary payments (Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris,
Laibson and Schuldt, 2008a; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a; Augenblick et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2014).
13These studies include examination of present bias or dynamic inconsistency for food choices (Read and van
Leeuwen, 1998; Sadoff et al., 2015); for highbrow and lowbrow movie choices (Read et al., 1999); for cafe reward
choices (Sayman and Onculer, 2009); for completing survey items (Carvalho et al., 2014); and for fertilizer
purchase decisions (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson, 2011). For discussion of this literature, see Sprenger (2015).
14Research in personnel economics documents the potential benefits of implementing piece rates relative to
lump sum payments (Lazear, 2000; Paarsch and Shearer, 1999; Shearer, 2004) and the elasticity of effort with
respect to the piece rate (Paarsch and Shearer, 2009). Our focus is not on the incentive effects of piece rates,
8points to the central role of preferences in determining the optimal design of incentives.15 The
unobservability of preferences poses a key obstacle to testing the optimality of implemented
contracts.16 We measure a normally unobservable preference parameter and then use such
measures in subsequent contract design. Rather than examining whether existing contracts are
optimal, we derive the optimal compensation scheme given a policy instrument (the interest
rate), a policy objective (smooth provision of service), and the measures of preferences, and
then experimentally test whether the optimized scheme improves performance. Our tailored
contracts demonstrate that structural preference estimates based on experimental procedures
can assist the design of incentives. In this sense, our study is connected to efforts in precision
medicine, where medical treatments are customized based on individuals’ genetic information.
We use the information contained in measurements of the primitives that govern economic
behavior (decision parameters) to customize incentives, in the same way that precision medicine
uses the information contained in DNA to customize healthcare.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our experimental design and corresponding
theoretical considerations for structurally estimating time preferences and tailoring contracts,
Section 3 present results, Section 4 provides robustness tests, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Structural Estimation
Our experiment has three components: eliciting the time preferences of vaccinators; identify-
ing individual discounting parameters, and, after assigning individually tailored contracts to
workers, testing whether these tailored contracts deliver on their specific objective.
but rather the benefits of using preference estimates to customize incentives.
15The relevant empirical literature points to a role for risk preference in contractual settings (Jensen and
Murphy, 1990; Haubrich, 1994; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Dubois, 2002; Bellemare and Shearer, 2013)
Chiappori and Salanie´ (2003) provide a review of empirical tests of predictions from contract theory about the
design of incentives.
16 In a review of the literature, Prendergast (1999) summarizes this point: “While the conclusions taken from
this literature could be correct, this seems a poor method of testing agency theory...because many of the factors
relevant for choosing the level of compensation are unobserved; the optimal piece rate depends on risk aversion
and the returns to effort, both of which are unknown to the econometrician...it is a little like claiming that
prices are too high without knowing costs.” (p. 19)
9In the first subsection below, we describe the smart-phone monitoring application we devel-
oped to track the productivity of our workers. We then describe how we identify discounting
parameters, and how we use these to design our tailored contracts. A fourth subsection provides
details of our experimental design.
2.1 Vaccinations and Smartphone Monitoring
The Department of Health in Lahore, Pakistan, employs Lady Health Worker vaccinators
throughout the city to conduct polio vaccination drives. Every month there is a vaccination
drive that is at least two days long. Vaccinators are organized into teams of one senior worker
and one junior assistant. These teams work together throughout the drive. Our experiment
focuses on the incentives of the senior vaccinator.
Prior to our study, the standard protocol for vaccination drives was to provide each vaccina-
tor a fixed target for total vaccinations over the drive and a map of potential households (called
a “micro-plan”). No explicit incentives for completing vaccinations were provided and vacci-
nators received a fixed daily wage of 100 rupees (around $1). Vaccinators were asked to walk
their map, knocking on each compound door, and vaccinating each child for whom parental
permission was granted.17 At the end of each day, vaccinators in each neighborhood convened
with their supervisor and self-reported their vaccination activity for the day.18 In principle, a
monitor could verify the claims.19 In practice, however, there was virtually no monitoring, and
strong reasons to suspect over-reporting.20
17Vaccinating a child consists of administering a few drops of oral vaccine. As there is no medical risk of
over-vaccination, vaccinators are encouraged to vaccinate every child for whom permission is granted. For
each attempted vaccination, vaccinators were asked to mark information related to the attempt (number of
children vaccinated, whether or not all children were available for vaccination, etc.) in chalk on the compound
wall. Appendix Figure A.1 provides an example of neighborhood micro-plan, Appendix Figure A.2 provides
an example of a vaccination attempt, and Appendix Figure A.3 provides a picture of a chalk marking on a
compound wall.
18Appendix Figure A.4 provides a picture of the form capturing the self-reports. The second column records
the number of vaccinations for the day. The seventh column reports the number of vials of vaccine used in the
process.
19This could potentially be done by walking the micro-plan and examining the chalk markings on each
compound wall.
20We attempted to independently audit vaccinators by following the trail of chalk markings, but our enu-
merators found the process too difficult to produce a reliable audit of houses visited. We do, however, know
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Panel A: Splash Page Panel B: Slider Bar
Figure 1: Vaccination Monitoring Smartphone App
Notes: The picture is of two screenshots from the smartphone app used by vaccinators. Panel A is depicted after partially scrolling
down. The top bar in Panel A (white letters) translates to “polio survey.” The next panel down (blue letters) translates to
“Dashboard” (literally transliterated). The black letters under the top button translate to “new activity”, the letters under the
second button translate to “send activity” and the letters under the lowest button translate to “set target”. The blue letters in
panel B translate to “set target”. The next line translates to “First day: 133; Second day: 133”. The text next to the box translates
to “finalize target” and the black letters on the bar translate to “set target.”
In collaboration with the Department of Health, we designed a smartphone-based monitor-
ing system. Each vaccinator in our study was given a smartphone equipped with a vaccination
monitoring application. The vaccinator was asked to record information related to each vac-
cination. Then, she was asked to take a picture of the home visited and her current vial of
vaccine. An image of the main page of the application is provided as Figure 1, Panel A. Data
from the smartphone system were aggregated in real-time on a dashboard available to senior
health administrators.21
the targets associated with each micro-plan prior to our monitoring intervention and that vaccinators almost
always reported meeting their targets exactly. Even with a bonus incentive and smartphone monitoring in place,
we find that vaccinators on average achieve only 62 percent (s.d. = 58 percent) of the target given by their
micro-plans. Vaccinators likely would achieve a smaller share of their target in the absence of both monitoring
and financial incentives.
21This dashboard system is based on the technology described in Callen et al. (2015) and is depicted in
Appendix Figure A.5.
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The smartphone system allows us to register vaccination attempts and provides a basis for
creating intertemporal bonus contracts designed to elicit vaccinator time preferences. We next
provide an outline of the bonus contracts.
2.2 Intertemporal Bonus Contracts
We worked with the Department of Health to implement intertemporal bonus contracts in
two-day drives in September, November and December of 2014.
The intertemporal bonus contracts required workers to complete a present value total of
V = 300 vaccination attempts in exchange for a fixed bonus of 1000 rupees. Vaccinators
set daily targets, v1 and v2, corresponding to vaccinations on day 1 and day 2 of the drive,
respectively. If either of the vaccination targets, v1 or v2, were not met, the 1000 rupees would
not be received, and the vaccinator would receive only her standard wage.
Each vaccinator was randomly assigned an interest rate translating vaccinations on day 1
to vaccinations on day 2. For each vaccination allocated to day 2, the number of vaccinations
allocated to day 1 would be reduced by R. Hence, the targets v1 and v2 satisfy the intertemporal
budget constraint
v1 +R · v2 = V.
This intertemporal bonus contract is identical to an experimental device termed a Convex
Time Budget used to investigate time preferences (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a,b).22 The
intertemporal allocation (v1, v2) potentially carries information on the time preferences of each
vaccinator. We next describe the relevant experimental variation and structural assumptions
that permit us to identify discounting parameters at the aggregate and individual level.
22For applications to field studies and effort allocations, see Augenblick et al. (2015); Carvalho et al. (2014);
Gine, Goldberg, Silverman and Yang (2010). We also borrow an additional design element from such studies—
minimum allocation requirements—from such studies. In order to avoid vaccinators allocating all their vac-
cinations to a single day of the drive, we placed minimum work requirements of v1 ≥ 12 and v2 ≥ 12. The
objective of minimum allocation requirements is to avoid confounds related to fixed costs. That is, by requiring
vaccinators to work on both days of the drive, we avoid confounding extreme patience or extreme impatience
with vaccinators simply not wishing to come to work on one of the two days.
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2.2.1 Experimental Variation and Structural Identification
Our design generates two sources of experimental variation. First, each vaccinator is randomly
assigned an interest rate, R, from the set R ∈ {0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.25}. These values were chosen
following Augenblick et al. (2015). Operationally, experimental variation in R was implemented
by providing each vaccinator with a slider bar on the introduction screen of the smartphone
application. Figure 1, Panel B depicts the slider bar with an assigned interest rate, R, equal
to 1.25. The vaccinator was asked to pull the slider bar to their desired allocation (v1, v2) and
then submit. The allocation was required to be submitted before commencing vaccination.
Second, each vaccinator was randomly assigned to either submit their allocation in advance
of day 1 of the drive or on the morning of day 1. We refer to the first of these as ‘Advance’
decisions and the second as ‘Immediate’ decisions. The assignment to either the Advance or
Immediate group was independent of the interest rate assignment. Section 2.4 describes the
efforts taken to make everything else besides allocation timing equal between these conditions.
Random assignment to Advance or Immediate choice and random assignment of R are
both critical design elements for identifying the discounting parameters of interest. We assume
that individuals minimize the discounted costs of effort subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint provided by their bonus contract. We make two further structural assumptions.
First, we assume a stationary, power cost of effort function c(v) = vγ, where v represents
vaccinations performed on a given day and γ > 1 captures the convex costs of effort. Second, we
assume that individuals discount the future quasi-hyperbolically (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999). Hence, the worker’s disutility of effort can be written as
vγ1 + β
1d=1δ · vγ2 .
The indicator 1d=1 captures whether the decision is made in advance or immediately on day
1. The parameters β and δ summarize individual discounting with β capturing the degree of
present bias, active for vaccinators who make Immediate decisions, that is, 1d=1 = 1. If β = 1,
13
the model nests exponential discounting with discount factor δ, while if β < 1 the decisionmaker
exhibits a present bias, being less patient in Immediate relative to Advance decisions.
Minimizing discounted costs subject to the intertemporal budget constraint of the experi-
ment yields marginal condition:
γvγ−11 −
β1d=1δ
R
γvγ−12 = 0. (1)
Interpreting this marginal condition as a moment requirement, time preferences can potentially
be estimated with standard minimum distance estimation techniques (Hansen, 1982; Hansen
and Singleton, 1982). Experimental manipulation ofR and 1d=1 provides identifying variation.
23
One critical assumption to the development above revolves around the force of the imple-
mented incentives. The contracts we implement feature a completion bonus of 1000 rupees paid
the day after the drive if both targets, v1 and v2 are met. The choice of large bonuses (around
10 times daily wages) followed the design logic discussed in Augenblick et al. (2015). Not com-
pleting allocated vaccinations creates a sizable penalty at any given point in time. Vaccinators
23A previous version of this paper expressed the Euler equation of (1) as(
v1
v2
)γ−1
1
β1d=1δ
=
1
R
.
Taking logs and rearranging yields
log
(
v1
v2
)
=
logδ
γ − 1 +
logβ
γ − 11d=1 −
1
γ − 1 logR.
If we assume that allocations satisfy the above equation subject to an additive error term, , we arrive at the
linear regression equation
log
(
v1
v2
)
=
logδ
γ − 1 +
logβ
γ − 11d=1 −
1
γ − 1 logR+ ,
which can also be estimated with standard techniques. Incorporating potential failure into such a linear estima-
tor was not feasible, but it does provide intuition for the identification of structural parameters from vaccinator
allocations, and make clear the purpose of our experimental variation in R and 1d=1. Variation in the interest
rate, R, identifies the shape of the cost function, γ, while variation in 1d=1 identifies β. Note that δ would be
identified from the average level of v1 relative to v2 when decisions are made in advance (i.e., identified from
the constant). An identical strategy for structurally estimating time preferences was introduced in controlled
experiments by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), and has precedents in a body of macroeconomic research identi-
fying aggregate preferences from consumption data. See, for example, Shapiro (1984); Zeldes (1989); Lawrance
(1991). Very similar results are obtained for our baseline estimates using this method and the minimum distance
method now implemented.
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should forecast that they will indeed complete the required vaccinations and so allocate them
according to their true preferences. If vaccinators forecast not completing required vaccinations
with some chance, the probability of completion has the potential to confound this approach
to measuring preferences.
Consider a vaccinator with probability p(v1, v2) of successfully completing her allocated
targets. Hence, the expected disutility of effort is
p(v1, v2)[v
γ
1 + β
1d=1δ · vγ2 ] + (1− p(v1, v2))[vγ1,n + β1d=1δ · vγ2,n],
where (v1,n, v2,n) are expected work to be completed on days one and two when not able to
complete the contract (e.g., perhaps the standard work-load). Similarly, the expected bonus
utility is
p(v1, v2)δ
2u(1000) + (1− p(v1, v2))δ2u(0).
For simplicity, we normalize the net utility under non-completion δ2u(0) − vγ1,n − β1d=1δ · vγ2,n
to be zero. Under this assumption, allocations are delivered by the constrained optimization
problem
maxv1,v2p(v1, v2)[δ
2u(1000)− vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ]
s.t. v1 +Rv2 = V.
The corresponding marginal condition,
γvγ−11 −
β1d=1δ
R
γvγ−12 =
(
∂p(v1,v2)
∂v1
− 1
R
∂p(v1,v2)
∂v2
p(v1, v2)
)
[δ2u(1000)− vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ],
highlights a central tradeoff between discounted marginal costs and marginal completion prob-
abilities. Of course, if the probability of success is independent of choice, ∂p(v1,v2)
∂v1
, ∂p(v1,v2)
∂v2
= 0,
the formulation provided in equation (1) is maintained. Otherwise, probabilistic completion
can create a wedge, influencing choice and biasing resulting inference on time preference if
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equation (1) is assumed.
The challenge created by probabilistic completion in settings like ours can be overcome with
additional assumptions of functional form and internal consistency. Provided a functional form
for p(v1, v2), we assume vaccinators know the correct mapping,
p(v1, v2) = p
∗(v1, v2),
where p∗(v1, v2) is the true completion probability induced by a given allocation (v1, v2). The
researcher observes either success or failure as draws from the distribution p∗(v1, v2).24 To
provide a functional form for p(v1, v2), we assume that the probability of completing a target
of v on day 1 or 2 is
p1(v) = p2(v) =
1
1 + αv
.
Provided α > 0, this completion function assumes that success is assured at v = 0 and dimin-
ishes as v increases. As such p(v1, v2) =
1
1+αv1
1
1+αv2
.
Under such probabilistic completion and internal consistency, two moment conditions ob-
tain:
γvγ−11 −
β1d=1δ
R
γvγ−12 −
( −α
(1 + αv1)
− 1
R
−α
(1 + αv2)
)
[δ2u(1000)− vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ] = 0, (2)
1
1 + αv1
1
1 + αv2
− p∗(v1, v2) = 0. (3)
Again, standard minimum distance methods can be applied to simultaneously estimate the pa-
rameters of p(v1, v2) and the discounting parameters of interest.
25 In effect, imposing internal
consistency on completion rates allows the researcher to quantify the wedge induced by consid-
24Hence, the function p(v1, v2), known to the vaccinator, can be recovered from choice and observed success.
It is as if p(v1, v2) represents the physical possibility of achieving a given allocation. Given that we assume
all vaccinators know this mapping, we assume away failures of rational expectations such as believing one
can achieve with higher probability than the truth. Intuitively, as in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) such
misguided beliefs about efficacy would carry quite similar predictions to those of present-biased preferences.
25Considering completion alone, equation (3) could be estimated with non-linear least squares in a similar way
to linear probability models with ordinary least squares. Though, in principle, one might predict completion
probabilities outside of the bounds [0,1], in practice this does not occur.
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ering marginal completion probabilities. It is important to note that without quality data on
actual completion, the exercise would be effectively impossible; highlighting the value of our
implemented monitoring technology.26
An additional issue generated by probabilistic completion is the presence of monetary utility,
u(1000). This value partially pins down the magnitude of the wedge created by marginal
completion probabilities. Indeed the net utility of completion, [δ2u(1000) − vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ],
can be set to any number with suitable definition of u(1000). Of course, for allocations to
carry any information, an obvious participation constraint, [δ2u(1000) − vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ] ≥
δ2u(0)−vγ1,n−β1d=1δ ·vγ2,n = 0, needs to be satisfied.27 To understand how slack this constraint
was, we asked our vaccinators survey questions attempting to identify the minimum bonus they
would require to participate in the program again. Of 330 respondents, 329 said they would
participate again for the same 1000 rupees bonus while only 42 said they would participate
again if the bonus were 900 rupees. Of course, such responses can be difficult to interpret
given a lack of incentives, but one view is that the value [δ2u(1000) − vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ] may
be only slightly higher than the normalized non-participation value of zero. When assessing
probabilistic completion, we set [δ2u(1000)− vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ] = 100.28
The above development delivers aggregate estimates of discounting parameters with each
vaccinator’s allocation contributing a single observation to the aggregate. Exercises exploring
heterogeneity in time preferences document substantial differences across people, even from rel-
atively homogeneous populations (see e.g., Harrison et al., 2002; Ashraf et al., 2006; Meier and
Sprenger, 2015). Given only a single observation per vaccinator, estimation of all parameters at
the individual level is infeasible. However, we can calculate each vaccinator’s discount factor,
which is either δi for those who make Advance decisions or (βδ)i for those who make Immediate
decisions. To make such a calculation, two further structural assumptions are required. First,
we assume every vaccinator shares a common cost function, γ = 2, corresponding to quadratic
26Naturally, the predictions may be sensitive to the imposed functional form of p(v1, v2). As such, in subsection
4.2 we discuss several alternative forms for p(v1, v2).
27Otherwise the individual would want to set v1, v2 to increase the probability of non-completion.
28In subsection 4.2 we provide sensitivity analysis for changes to this assumed value.
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cost. Second, when assessing probabilistic completion we assume a common completion func-
tion, p(v1, v2), evaluated using the aggregate estimated completion parameter, α. Third, we
assume relevant marginal conditions (equation (1) or equation (2) in the case of probabilistic
completion) hold exactly. Let Ri be the value of R assigned to individual i, let 1d=1,i be their as-
signment to Advance or Immediate choice, and let (v1,i, v2,i) be their allocation of vaccinations.
Without considerations related to probabilistic completion,
Ri · v1,i
v2,i
= (β1d=1,iδ)i, (4)
the interest rate-adjusted ratio of allocated vaccinations identifies a discount factor for each
individual, i. Under our formulation of probabilistic completion, this becomes
Ri ·
(
v1,i −
(
−α
(1+αv1,i)
− 1
R
−α
(1+αv2,i)
)
[100]
)
v2,i
= (β1d=1,iδ)i. (5)
The structural assumptions required for identification of aggregate and individual discount
factors are potentially quite restrictive. Our research design, which involves tailoring contracts
to individual discount factors, required commitment to the specific functional forms of equations
(1) and (4). As noted above, imperfect completion was not an issue that we had forecast and so
our tailored contracts do not focus on achieving target completion rates. However, our tailoring
exercise does yield clear auxiliary predictions for patterns of completion across groups. As such,
we assess these predictions alongside those for allocation behavior. Not being pre-specified ex-
ante, these analyses should be viewed as exploratory. In sub-section 4.2, we also assess the
validity of a set of required assumptions and present further exploratory analysis related to
alternative functional forms.
2.3 Tailored Contracts
Each vaccinator’s allocation in an intertemporal bonus contract identifies her discount factor
for vaccinations, either δi for those who make Advance decisions or (βδ)i for those who make
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Immediate decisions. We consider a policymaker who knows such preferences and wishes to
achieve a specific policy objective. The policymaker has only one policy lever: manipulation of
the interest rate, Ri, at the individual level. We formalize the problem as maximizing policy
preferences, Q(v1,i(Ri), v2,i(Ri)), subject to the vaccinator’s offer curve. The problem is stated
as
maxR,i Q(v
∗
1,i(Ri), v
∗
2,i(Ri)),
where (v∗1,i(Ri), v
∗
2,i(Ri)) are defined as the solution to the vaccinator’s minimization problem
noted above. The solution maps the policy preferences into an interest rate for each vaccinator.
One can consider many potential forms of policy preference, with policymakers desiring a variety
of intertemporal patterns of effort. As proof-of-concept, we consider first a policy maker with
one extreme form of preference, Q(v1,i(Ri), v2,i(Ri)) = min[v1,i(Ri), v2,i(Ri)].
29 Such Leontief
preferences correspond to a policymaker who desires perfectly smooth provision of service. This
problem has an intuitive solution under perfect completion. The worker’s intertemporal Euler
equation (4) yields smooth allocations and provision, v1,i = v2,i, when Ri = (β
1d=1,iδ)i. Hence,
the tailored contracts give each vaccinator a value of R equal to their discount factor defined in
equation (4). Note that the structural discounting parameters are critical in this development.
With information on discount factors, contracts can be tailored for each worker to achieve
specific policy objectives.
In a second two-day drive, we investigate the promise of tailored contracts. All vaccinators
from the first drive were invited to participate in a second intertemporal bonus contract. Vac-
cinators were unaware that their previously measured behavior would be used to potentially
inform their subsequent contracts. This sidesteps an important possibility that vaccinators
might alter their first drive behavior in order to receive a more desirable interest rate in the
second drive.
29The ability of our data to speak to alternative policy preferences is discussed in section 4.3.6. Leontief
preferences in this environment are extreme, but there is general interest in understanding mechanisms to drive
smooth behavior, particularly for saving and for avoiding procrastination.
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Half of vaccinators were given an individually tailored intertemporal bonus contract,
v1,i +R
∗
i · v2,i = V,
where R∗i is defined as in equation (4), either (βδ)i or δi depending on whether they made Im-
mediate or Advance decisions.30 Some vaccinators’ allocation behavior in the first drive implied
extreme discount factors and hence extreme values of R∗i . Our tailoring exercise focused only
on a Tailoring Sample of vaccinators with discount factors between 0.75 and 1.5.31 Vaccinators
outside of these bounds were given either the upper or lower bound accordingly.
The other half of vaccinators were given a random intertemporal bonus contract,
v1,i + R˜i · v2,i = V,
where R˜i was drawn from a random uniform distribution U [0.75, 1.5]. The bounds on the
distribution of R˜i were determined to match the bounds on R
∗
i , while the choice of a random
uniform control—rather than a single value of R˜i or some alternative distribution—was chosen
to provide flexible scope for constructing a range of comparison groups for tailored interest rates
by drawing subsets of vaccinators assigned to the R˜i condition (see section 4.2.3 for details).
We find our results are robust to a range of comparison groups.
Random assignment to tailoring in Drive 2 is stratified on the measure of absolute distance
to equal provision |v1
v2
−1|, based on allocations from Drive 1.32 This measure of distance to equal
provision also serves as our eventual outcome measure when analyzing the effect of assignment
to tailoring in Drive 2. Stratifying assignment on key outcomes of interest is standard practice in
the field experimental literature (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009), as it generally increases precision
in estimating treatment effects.
30Note that this tailoring exercise requires that vaccinators remain in either the Immediate or Advance
assignment across drives.
31Of our sample of 338 vaccinators, 57 exhibit discount factors outside of this range. The Tailoring Sample
consists of the remaining 281 vaccinators.
32Specifically, subjects are divided into terciles by this measure, with a roughly even number in each bin being
assigned to the tailoring and to the control condition.
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Recognizing imperfect completion generates nuanced predictions in the tailored drive. First,
providing the tailored interest rate based on equation (4) is no longer predicted to exactly equal-
ize v1,i and v2,i. Rather it leads to a prediction adjusted for marginal completion probabilities
as in equation (5). In practice, this difference is quite small under our estimated completion
function. As such, the policy target of equal provision is effectively unchanged by examining im-
perfect completion. Second, and more importantly, the tailored policy assigns more impatient
subjects lower values of R∗i . Given the present-value budget constraint v1,i+R
∗
i ·v2,i = V , more
impatient individuals are required to do weakly more work than less impatient ones. In effect,
impatient vaccinators ‘pay’ for their impatience with a lower R and a corresponding increase
in total work. Given that p(v1, v2) is decreasing in its arguments, more impatient vaccinators
should be less likely to succeed under the tailored policy regime. Indeed, we can assess the
predictive accuracy of our estimated model for patterns of failure and the relationship between
completion, contract terms, and preferences across tailored and untailored groups.
2.4 Design Details
Our experiment is divided into two drives. The first drive took place November 10-11, 2014
with training on November 7. The second drive took place December 8-9, 2014 with training
on December 5.
2.4.1 Training and Allocation Decisions
On November 7, all vaccinators participating in the November 10-11 drive received two hours
of training at one of three locations in central Lahore on using the monitoring features of
the smartphone application. Both Advance and Immediate vaccinators were given identical
training on the intertemporal bonus contracts and the process by which allocations were made
and submitted.
At the end of the training, vaccinators assigned to Advance decision were asked to select
their allocations by using the page on their smartphone application. Assistance was available
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from training staff for those who required it. Vaccinators assigned to Immediate decision were
told they would select their allocations using their smartphone application on Monday morning
before beginning work. A hotline number was provided if assistance was required for those in
the Immediate condition.
The training activities on December 5, for the December 8-9 drive were identical. However,
because vaccinators had previously been trained on the smartphone application, this portion
of the training was conducted as a refresher.
2.4.2 Experimental Timeline
Figure 2 summarizes our experimental timeline and the sample for each vaccination drive of
our study.
Drive 0, Failed Drive, September 26-30, 2014: We had hoped to begin our study on Friday,
September 26th, 2014 with a training session. 336 vaccinators had been recruited, were
randomized into treatments, and trained. Advance allocation decisions were collected from
half of the subjects on Friday, September 26th. On Monday, September 29th, when we
attempted to collect immediate allocation decisions, there was apparently a disruption in the
mobile network that prevented 82 of 168 Immediate decision vaccinators from submitting their
allocations. This caused us to abandon this drive for the purposes of measuring preferences
for subsequent tailoring of contracts. The drive, however, was completed and intertemporal
bonuses were paid. For the 82 individuals who did not make their allocations, we contacted
them, allowed them to continue working, and paid bonuses for all. Figure 2 provides sample
details.33 For completeness, we present data from Drive 0 in Appendix Table A.2, but do not
use Drive 0 for the purposes of tailoring contracts.
Drive 1, November 7-11, 2014: Of the original 336 vaccinators in our failed drive, 57 did not
33Appendix Table A.1 checks for balance by failure of the smartphone application in Drive 0. Only one of
the eight comparison of means hypothesis tests reject equality at the 10 percent level.
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participate in the next drive organized for November 7 - 11. We recruited replacements with
the help of the Department of Health, identifying a total of 349 vaccinators to participate in
the intertemporal bonus program. The entire sample was re-randomized into interest rate and
allocation timing conditions. Training was conducted on November 7, and Advance allocation
decisions were collected. The drive began on November 10, and Immediate allocation decisions
were collected. 174 vaccinators were assigned to the Advance Choice condition and 175 were
assigned to the Immediate Choice condition. Bonuses were paid on November 12. While all
174 vaccinators in the Advance Choice condition provided an allocation decision, only 164
of 175 in the Immediate Choice condition provided an allocation. Because 11 vaccinators
attrited from the Immediate Choice condition, we also provide bounds on the estimated
effect of decision timing using the method of Lee (2009). In addition, for 232 vaccinators, we
have allocation decisions in both the failed drive, Drive 0, and Drive 1, forming a potentially
valuable panel of response. Figure 2 provides sample details.
Drive 2, December 5-9, 2014: Of the 338 vaccinators who participated in Drive 1 and provided
an allocation, 337 again participated in Drive 2. These vaccinators were randomly assigned to
be tailored or untailored in their Drive 2 bonus contracts. Importantly, vaccinators retained
their Advance or Immediate assignment, such that Drive 2 delivers a 2x2 design for tailoring
and allocation timing. This allows us to investigate the effect of tailoring in general, and if the
effects depend on whether present bias is active.
2.4.3 Sample Details
Table 1 summarizes our sample of vaccinators from Drive 1 and provides tests of experimental
balance on observables. Column (1) presents the mean and standard deviation for each variable;
columns (2) to (9) present the mean and standard error for each of our eight treatment arms,
and column 10 presents a p-value corresponding to joint tests of equality. Our sample is almost
exclusively female, more than 90 percent Punjabi in all treatment arms, and broadly without
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Failed Drive 0:
September 26 - 30, 2014
Drive 1:
November 7 - 11, 2014
Drive 2:
December 5 - 9, 2014
Objectives: 1. Measure preferences 
                    2. Test for dynamic inconsistency 
Sample:  336 
Notes:  82 vaccinators of the 336 could not 
 select task allocations because of a 
 problem with the app. 
Sample Allocation:
R=0.9 R=1 R=1.1 R=1.25
Advance 
Choice 43 46 40 45
Immediate 
Choice 41 46 38 39
R=0.9 R=1 R=1.1 R=1.25
Advance 
Choice 42 42 42 42
Immediate 
Choice 42 42 42 42
Objectives: 1. Measure preferences 
                    2. Test for dynamic inconsistency 
Sample:   349 
Notes: Preferences are estimated for 338 of the 
349 vaccinators recruited. A panel for Drive 0 and 
Drive 1 is available for 232 vaccinators. 
Sample Allocation:
Tailored Untailored
Advance Choice 85 88
Immediate Choice 84 80
Objectives: 1. Test tailored contracts 
      2. Test tailoring by decision timing 
Sample:  Tailored (169), Untailored (168) 
Notes:   337 of the 338 vaccinators participating 
in Drive 1 also participated in Drive 2 and were 
assigned to either Tailored or Untailored.  
Sample Allocation:
Figure 2: Experiment Overview
Notes: This figure provides an overview of the timing and sample breakdown of the experiment. Assignment to the advance choice
and immediate choice condition in Drive 2 is inherited from vaccination Drive 1. Note that: (i) 57 vaccinators participated only in
Failed Drive 0; (ii) 6 vaccinators participated in Drive 1 only; (iii) 1 vaccinator participated in Failed Drive 0 and Drive 1, but not
in Drive 2 (iii) 67 vaccinators participated in drives 2 and 3 only; (iv) 271 vaccinators participated in all three rounds.
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access to formal savings accounts. Vaccinators are generally highly experienced with an average
of 10.5 years of health work experience and 10.4 years of polio work experience. Consistent
with randomization, of the 8 tests performed, only the test performed on an indicator variable
equal to one for Punjabi subjects suggests baseline imbalance.
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Covariates Balance
Full Advance Decision Immediate Decision p-value
Sample R=0.9 R=1 R=1.1 R=1.25 R=0.9 R=1 R=1.1 R=1.25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Demographics
Gender (Female = 1) 0.985 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.978 0.975 0.978 0.947 1.000 0.284
[0.121] (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.037) (0.000)
Years of Education 10.415 10.767 10.652 10.650 10.279 9.850 10.565 10.184 10.282 0.500
[2.291] (0.416) (0.273) (0.462) (0.330) (0.298) (0.368) (0.238) (0.395)
Number of Children 3.424 3.419 3.422 3.538 3.286 3.605 3.391 3.421 3.333 0.997
[1.826] (0.279) (0.301) (0.309) (0.296) (0.286) (0.274) (0.243) (0.294)
Punjabi (=1) 0.952 0.930 0.932 1.000 0.955 0.950 0.978 0.917 0.947 0.022
[0.215] (0.039) (0.038) (0.000) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022) (0.047) (0.037)
Financial Background
Has a Savings Account (=1) 0.269 0.310 0.250 0.275 0.302 0.350 0.283 0.189 0.179 0.630
[0.444] (0.072) (0.066) (0.071) (0.071) (0.076) (0.067) (0.065) (0.062)
Participated in a ROSCA (=1) 0.389 0.349 0.378 0.425 0.350 0.500 0.289 0.351 0.487 0.482
[0.488] (0.074) (0.073) (0.079) (0.076) (0.080) (0.068) (0.079) (0.081)
Health Work Experience
Years in Health Department 10.520 10.605 10.578 10.211 11.549 9.050 10.678 10.395 11.026 0.456
[4.961] (0.777) (0.695) (0.685) (0.792) (0.695) (0.846) (0.867) (0.808)
Years as Polio Vaccinator 10.428 10.209 10.728 11.050 11.143 9.238 9.935 10.447 10.692 0.581
[4.727] (0.758) (0.689) (0.668) (0.743) (0.689) (0.713) (0.858) (0.751)
# Vaccinators 338 43 46 40 45 41 46 38 39
Notes: This table checks balance across the eight treatment groups. Column 1 presents the mean for each variable based on our sample
of 338 vaccinators. These 338 vaccinators comprise the estimation sample in Table 2, which reports tests of dynamic inconsistency.
Standard deviations are in brackets. Columns 2 to 9 report the mean level of each variable, with standard errors in parentheses, for
each treatment cell. For each variable, Column 10 reports the p-value of a joint test that the mean levels are the same for all treatment
cells (Columns 2–9). The last row presents the number of observations in each treatment condition. A ROSCA is an informal Rotating
Savings and Credit Association. Some calculations used a smaller sample size due to missing information. The proportion of subjects
with missing information for each variable is never greater than 3.5 percent (8 vaccinators did not report whether they had participated
in a ROSCA).
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3 Results
We first report results related to the elicitation of intertemporal preference parameters, then
evaluate the possibility of tailoring incentives based on individual preferences.34
3.1 Elicitation of Time Preferences
3.1.1 Aggregate Behavior
Figure 3 presents median behavior in the elicitation phase of our experiment, graphing the
allocation to the sooner work date, v1, for each interest rate.
35 Separate series are provided for
Advance and Immediate choice. In Panel A we provide data for our Full Sample of 338 vacci-
nators who provided allocations in Drive 1. In Panel B we focus only on our Tailoring Sample
of 281 vaccinators, trimming 57 vaccinators with extreme allocation behavior that would imply
individual discount factors from equation (4) outside of the range of [0.75, 1.5]. Two features
of Figure 3 are notable. First, subjects appear to respond to the between-subject variation in
interest rate. As the value R increases, vaccinations allocated to v1 count relatively less to-
wards reaching the two-day target of V = 300. Vaccinators respond to this changing incentive
by reducing their allocation of v1. Second, there is a tendency of present bias. Vaccinators
appear to allocate fewer vaccinations to v1 when making Immediate choice.
Also graphed in Figure 3 are patterns of completion across experimental conditions in Drive
1. We determine completion by examining the records obtained from each vaccinator’s cell
phone application. Of 338 vaccinators in Drive 1, 288 registered activity in their cell phone
application during the drive, while 50 generated no data. The cellular network in Lahore
34In addition, to test just the effect of providing the $10 bonus, we randomly assigned 85 vaccinators in Drive
0 to carry a phone but not receive an incentive. 72 of these vaccinators also participated in Drive 1, retaining
the same ‘phone only’ treatment status. In Drive 1, vaccinators in the ‘phone only’ group attempted 169.47
vaccinations (s.e. = 15.98) and vaccinators in the phone plus incentives group attempted 205.82 vaccinations
(se = 7.79) yielding an estimated increase of 36.35 attempts (s.e. = 18.42, p = 0.05). 49.3% of vaccination
attempts were successful for the ‘phone only’ group while 49.1% of vaccinations were successful for the ‘phone
plus incentives’ group. The difference in success rates between the two groups is small (0.2 percentage points)
and statistically insignificant (p=0.69).
35We opt to provide medians as the average data are influenced by several extreme outliers in allocation
behavior. Qualitatively similar patterns are, however, observed.
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is known to have some coverage gaps. As such, we consider a subject to have successfully
completed their work if they completed an average of 90% or more of their required tasks.36
One-hundred seventy-four (51.5%) subjects successfully completed by this measure. Appendix
Figure A.6 presents the histogram of average completion percentages across subjects, showing
a bimodal distribution of success and failure. Successful completion seems largely unrelated
to assigned interest rate in Drive 1. Interestingly, however, subjects assigned to Immediate
choice conditions seem to complete at lower rates than their Advance choice counterparts. This
evidence is additionally supportive of a present-biased interpretation. Subjects in the Immediate
choice condition postpone more work, which they are subsequently unable to satisfactorily
complete.
Table 2 presents corresponding median regression analysis for aggregate behavior in Drive
1.37 In Panel A, We regress v1 on R and whether the allocation decision is immediate. Column
(1) echoes the findings from Figure 3, Panel A: in our Full Sample, vaccinators assigned to
Immediate choice allocate a median of 2.00 (s.e. = 1.13) fewer vaccinations to v1 than those
assigned to Advance choice. Similar patterns are observed in column (2), focusing only on our
Tailoring Sample. Vaccinators in the Tailoring Sample allocate a median of 3 fewer vaccinations
to v1 when making immediate choice.
38 In Panel B, we repeat these analyses with linear
probability models and an indicator for completion, Complete(= 1), as dependent variable. As
in Figure 3, we find no discernible relationship between assigned interest rate and completion.
However, individuals assigned to Immediate choice are between 9 and 13 percentage points less
likely to satisfactorily completed their allocated vaccinations.
36Average completion rates are calculated as 1/2(min(Completed1/v1, 1) +min(Completed2/v2, 1))
37Appendix Table A.2 presents identical analysis incorporating data from failed Drive 0, and identifies qual-
itatively similar effects.
38As discussed in Section 2.4.2 above, 11 vaccinators attrited from the sample in the immediate choice
condition in Drive 1. Bounding the effect of being assigned to the immediate choice condition on v1 allocations
using the method of Lee (2009) provides a lower bound of −3.78 tasks (s.e. = 2.06) and an upper bound of
0.205 (2.06) tasks.
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Figure 3: Aggregate Experimental Response
Notes: This figure examines whether tasks assigned to the sooner work date and completion respond to the experimental variation
in the interest rate R and in decision timing. Allocation data represent medians for each of the eight treatment groups and
completion data represent group averages. Panel A depicts the Full Sample and Panel B depicts the tailoring sample (vaccinators
with R∗ < 0.75 or R∗ > 1.5). Black series are advance choice groups and gray series are immediate choice groups.
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Table 2: Aggregate Drive 1 Behavior
(1) (2)
Full Sample Tailoring Sample
Panel A: Dependent Variable: v1
Immediate Decision (=1) -2.00* -3.00***
(1.13) (0.91)
Interest Rate (R) -54.29*** -66.67***
(4.38) (3.66)
Constant 201.86*** 216.33***
(4.72) (3.93)
Median Advance Choice 146.5 148
# Observations 338 281
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Completed (=1)
Immediate Decision (=1) -0.087 -0.128**
(0.054) (0.060)
Interest Rate (R) 0.143 0.095
(0.210) (0.241)
Constant 0.405* 0.483*
(0.227) (0.258)
Average Completion Rate 0.515 0.523
# Observations 338 281
Notes: This table reports on the effects of decision timing and inter-
est rate variation on vaccinations allocated to the first day of the drive
Panel B: Linear probability model for completion. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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3.1.2 Aggregate Preference Parameters
The raw data of Figure 3 and analysis of Table 2 indicate responsiveness of vaccinators to our
experimental parameters, R and whether allocations are Immediate or Advance. The develop-
ment of section 2 links allocation behavior and completion to these experimental parameters
via structural models of choice. In Table 3, we present parameter estimates from minimum
distance estimates from equation (1) or equations (2) and (3) when considering probabilistic
completion.
In Panel A of Table 3, we present estimates for the Full Sample under varying assumptions
for γ. In columns (1) and (2), we restrict to γ = 2, providing an aggregate benchmark for
our individual analysis which calculates individual discount factors under the assumption of
quadratic costs. Without controlling for probabilistic completion, we find β = 0.935 (s.e.
= 0.030), and reject the null hypothesis of no present bias (χ2(1) = 4.841, (p = 0.028).
Simultaneously estimating probabilistic completion increases the point estimate for both β
and δ, such that the extent of present bias falls outside of the range of standard statistical
significance (p = 0.104). The key completion parameter α is estimated precisely to be 0.003,
such that an individual assigned R = 1 who allocates 150 vaccinations to each date would be
expected to complete with probability around 0.50. A similar pattern is observed in Panel B
for the Tailoring Sample. The parameter β is estimated to be less than one, at the cusp of
statistical significance when controlling for probabilistic completion.
As the assumed degree of curvature is increased in Table 3, columns (3) through (8), both
β and δ decrease, but the general conclusions are maintained. A measure of model fit, the
criterion value, does tend to improve as γ is increased. However, increasing γ further to 3.5
generates a sharp change in the quality of fit and the completion parameter α is estimated to
be negative, inconsistent with our assumption that p(v1, v2) is declining in its arguments.
39 In
principle, variation in the interest rate R, should provide an opportunity to identify γ without
restriction. Unfortunately, our minimum distance estimators did not reliably converge without
39Results available upon request.
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restrictions. This highlights a potentially important issue with respect to the estimates of
Table 3: the estimated parameters predict more sensitivity to R than truly exists in the data.40
This mis-specification presents a clear challenge for using individual preference parameters for
tailored contracts. Having committed to a possibly mis-specified functional form ex-ante, any
success in tailoring contracts should likely be viewed as a lower bound on the potential benefits
of such initiatives.
Table 3: Aggregate Parameter Estimates, Drive 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ = 2 γ = 2.5 γ = 3 γ = 3.25
Panel A: Full Sample
β 0.935 0.952 0.922 0.946 0.906 0.938 0.896 0.934
(0.030) (0.029) (0.040) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.055)
δ 0.985 0.992 0.958 0.967 0.932 0.942 0.919 0.931
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
α 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0 : β = 1. (χ
2(1)) 4.841 2.637 3.889 1.856 3.600 1.531 3.609 1.449
[p-value] [0.028] [0.104] [0.049] [0.173] [0.058] [0.216] [0.057] [0.229]
Criterion Value 0.278 0.310 0.217 0.249 0.180 0.212 0.166 0.199
# Vaccinators 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338
Panel B: Tailoring Sample
β 0.969 0.970 0.962 0.963 0.954 0.955 0.949 0.951
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
δ 1.017 1.018 1.003 1.004 0.990 0.991 0.984 0.985
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
α 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0 : β = 1. (χ
2(1)) 2.880 2.713 2.716 2.575 2.729 2.592 2.754 2.618
[p-value] [0.090] [0.100] [0.099] [0.109] [0.099] [0.107] [0.097] [0.106]
Criterion Value 0.370 0.384 0.268 0.284 0.196 0.213 0.170 0.186
# Vaccinators 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
Notes: This reports structural estimates of β, δ, and α obtained using minimum distance estimation of equations
(1) in even columns or (2) and (3) in odd columns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Test statistic for
β = 1 with p-value in brackets. Panel A provides estimates for the Full Sample, Panel B provides estimates for
the Tailoring Sample.
40Appendix Figure A.8 reproduces Figure 3, with in-sample predictions from Table 3, column (2). Though
the estimates do match the responsiveness of behavior from R = 1 to R = 1.1, they do not generate the lack of
sensitivity for other changes in R.
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3.1.3 Individual Preference Parameters
The aggregate estimates of Table 3 mask substantial heterogeneity across subjects. Following
equations (4) and (5), we calculate individual discount factors for each vaccinator assuming
quadratic costs. For those vaccinators assigned to Advance choice, this discount factor corre-
sponds to δi, while for those assigned to Immediate choice it corresponds to (βδ)i. Without
accounting for completion In Drive 1, the median [25th, 75th percentile] discount factor in
Advance choice is 1.015 [0.88, 1.18], while the median discount factor in Immediate choice is
1 [0.84, 1.21]. Accounting for completion, the median [25th,75th percentile] discount factor
in Advance choice is again 1.015 [0.88, 1.18], while the median discount factor in Immediate
choice is again 1 [0.84, 1.21]. The correlation in discount factors with and without account-
ing for completion is effectively 1, indicating probabilistic completion does not dramatically
confound any individual inferences. Indeed, the difference between the implied discount factor
with and without accounting for completion has a median [25th-75th %-ile] value of 0.00004
[-0.0002, 0.0001]. Both discount factors are used in our analysis with the relevant calculation
noted.
As noted above, an important minority of vaccinators have extreme discount factor calcu-
lations. Without accounting for completion, fifty-seven of 338 subjects in Drive 1 have implied
discount factors either above 1.5 or below 0.75.41 We term such vaccinators the ‘Boundary
Sample.’ As our tailoring exercise focuses on individuals with discount factors between 0.75
and 1.5, we restrict our individual analysis to the 281 vaccinators in the Tailoring Sample, and
discuss the Boundary Sample in robustness tests (see section 4.2). Figure 4 presents histograms
of implied discount factors for the 280 Tailoring Sample vaccinators in Advance and Immedi-
ate decisions. Two features are notable. First, in both contexts substantial heterogeneity in
discount factors is observed. The 25th to 75th percentile ranges from 0.92 to 1.15 in Advance
choice and from 0.88 to 1.15 in Immediate choice. Second, a present bias is observed in the
shape of the distributions. The one period discount factors are skewed below 1 in Immediate
41Such extreme behavior is slightly more pronounced in Immediate choice (34 vaccinators) relative to Advance
choice (23 vaccinators), (t = 1.84, p = 0.07).
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Figure 4: Individual Discount Factors in the Tailoring Sample
Notes: This figure provides histograms of one period discount factors calculated from equation (4) separately for subjects in the
Advance Choice condition (left panel) and the Immediate Choice condition (right panel). The sample is restricted to vaccinators
in the Tailoring Sample (vaccinators with R∗i ≥ 0.75 or R∗i ≤ 1.5). Calculating discount factors from equation (5) accounting for
probabilistic completion yields an identical figure.
relative to Advance choice. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions sits at the
cusp of statistical significance (DKS = 0.15, p = 0.10).
The observed heterogeneity in discount factors across vaccinators resonates with prior ex-
ercises demonstrating heterogeneity of preferences even with relatively homogeneous samples
(see e.g., Harrison et al., 2002; Ashraf et al., 2006; Meier and Sprenger, 2015). Further, this
heterogeneity is precisely the reason there is promise in tailoring contracts individually.
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3.2 Tailored Contracts
Individual discount factors from Drive 1 in hand, we turn to the possibility of tailoring intertem-
poral contracts to individual preferences. Of the 281 vaccinators in the Tailoring Sample, 280
participated in Drive 2.42 Of these, 142 vaccinators were assigned a value of R equal to their
discount factor. That is, tailored vaccinators were assigned R∗i = (β
1d=1,iδ)i, from equation
(4), which should induce equal provision of effort through time, v1,i = v2,i. Given the minute
differences between implied discount factors with and without controlling for completion, this
policy target is effectively identical regardless of whether the discount factor from equation (4)
or equation (5) is used. The remaining 138 vaccinators serve as control and were assigned a
uniform random interest rate R˜i ∈ U [0.75, 1.5].43
Figure 5, Panel A plots vaccinations allocated to the first day of the drive against vaccina-
tions allocated to the second day of Drive 2 separately for the tailored and the untailored group.
Notable from Figure 5 is the relative dispersion of the untailored controls around the 45-degree
line of equal provision relative to the tailored treatments. Also graphed in Panel A for the tai-
lored group is the policy target accounting for probabilistic completion. This line is effectively
indistinguishable from the 45 degree line such that whether one accounts for completion or not,
the policy should induce smooth allocations.
We examine differences in the distance from the 45-degree line using the metric |v1,i
v2,i
− 1|,
the absolute percentage difference between v1 and v2. The mean distance for the untailored
group is 0.61 (s.d. = 3.64) while the mean distance for the tailored group is 0.14 (s.d. = 0.23),
t278 = 1.54, (p = 0.13). The lack of statistical significance is due primarily to several substantial
distance outliers. Trimming the top and bottom 1% of the sample of Drive 2 allocations, the
mean distance for the untailored group is 0.15 (s.d. = 0.19), while the mean distance for the
tailored group is 0.10 (s.d. = 0.11), t265 = 3.07, (p < 0.01).
42Vaccinators from the boundary sample were allowed to participate in Drive 2 and were either assigned
R˜i ∈ U [0.75, 1.5] if they were in the untailored control group (31 subjects) or assigned Ri = 0.75 or Ri = 1.5 if
they were in the tailored group and had R∗i < 0.75 (15 subjects) or R
∗
i > 1.5 (11 subjects). See section 4.2 for
analysis of the boundary sample.
43As noted in section 2.3, assignment to the tailored or the untailored group was conducted via stratified
randomization with strata based upon the tercile of differences from equal provision of effort in Drive 1.
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In Table 4, we provide corresponding least squares regression analysis. Following best
practice for such analysis (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009), we control for fixed effects for each
stratum in the stratified randomization. In column (1), we analyze all 280 subjects and note
a sizable reduction in distance under tailoring that falls just outside the range of significance.
Echoing our raw results, when excluding outliers in column (2), we find that tailoring serves
to reduce distance from equal provision significantly by around six percentage points. Relative
to the untailored controls, tailoring reduces distance from equal provision by around one-third,
indicating substantial benefits to our tailored policy initiative. In column (3), we additionally
control for the value of R∗i or R˜i assigned in Drive 2. This regression identifies whether tailoring
generates more equal provision for a given value of R, and hence controls for any differences in
interest rates across tailored and untailored groups. Again, tailoring serves to reduce distance
significantly.
Vaccinators assigned to Advance choice in Drive 1 remain in Advance choice in Drive 2,
while those assigned to Immediate choice remain in Immediate choice. In columns (3)-(6) of
Table 4, we examine differential effects of tailoring across these two groups. Given that the
individual discount factors skew lower in Immediate choice, one might expect larger distance
measures in Immediate controls (and hence greater benefits to tailoring). This is precisely
what is observed. Untailored Immediate choice is associated with significantly larger distance
measures and tailoring for Immediate choice significantly reduces these distances. In columns
(5) and (6), excluding outliers, we find that tailoring in Immediate choice reduces distance from
equal provision by around one-half. Note that this effect size (8.4 percentage points) is similar
to the effect of moving a vaccinator from advance to immediate choice in the untailored group
(8 percentage points). Tailoring in Advance choice appears to directionally reduce distance as
well, but the effect is not significant, potentially due to the relatively small average distance
measure identified in untailored Advance choice.
In addition to allocation behavior, we can use individual discount factor measures from
equation (5) in Drive 1 to predict completion probabilities out-of-sample for Drive 2. Our
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Table 4: The Effect of Tailoring Intertemporal Incentives
Dependent variable: |v1,iv2,i − 1|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailored (=1) -0.489 -0.059*** -0.049*** -0.070 -0.019 -0.014
(0.321) (0.019) (0.018) (0.069) (0.019) (0.019)
Immediate Choice (=1) 0.982* 0.125*** 0.117***
(0.573) (0.035) (0.035)
Tailored x Immediate -0.888 -0.090** -0.084**
(0.604) (0.040) (0.040)
Constant 1.407 0.159*** 0.022 0.873 0.094*** -0.004
(0.860) (0.023) (0.058) (0.552) (0.026) (0.057)
Stratum FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude 99th and 1st Percentiles No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Drive 2 R∗i or R˜i No No Yes No No Yes
R-Squared 0.035 0.060 0.082 0.053 0.142 0.154
Mean in Untailored Contract 0.612 0.153 0.153 0.612 0.153 0.153
Mean in Untailored Advance 0.089 0.089 0.089
Mean in Untailored Immediate 0.701 0.169 0.169
# Vaccinators 280 267 267 280 267 267
Notes: This table reports the effects of tailoring on the equality of effort provision over time. The measure | vtvt+1 − 1|
(the percentage difference between tasks allocated to day 1 and day 2 of the drive) reflects the distance of the task
allocation (v1,v2) from equality (v1 = v2). Column (1) reports a regression of this measure on an indicator equal to
one for subjects in the tailored group. Column (2) reports estimates from the same specification excluding outliers.
Column (3) controls for the interest rate assignment in round 2. Column (4) provides estimates on the same sample as
column (1) interacting treatment with being in the immediate choice condition. Columns (5) and (6) apply the same
restrictions to the sample as columns (2) and (3) respectively. Ordinary least squares regressions. Heteroskedasticity
robust White standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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tailored policy links individual discount factors to assigned interest rates. Impatient subjects
‘pay’ for their impatience with lower values of R∗i . Given the intertemporal constraint v1 +
R∗i · v2 = 300, this means less patient individuals will ultimately have to do weakly more
work. Under our assumed functional form for p(v1, v2) this implies a relationship between
completion probabilities and patience. In the tailored group, less patient individuals should
be substantially less likely to successfully complete their Drive 2 targets. In Figure 5, Panel
B, we plot the predicted completion rate in Drive 2 against the individual discount factor.
A tight relationship between patience and predicted completion exists in the tailored group,
and no discernible relationship exists for the untailored group. In Panel B, we also plot the
linear fit from the regression of realized Drive 2 completion against discount factors.44 Closely
matching the prediction, true completion probabilities are positively correlated with discount
factors under the tailored contract terms, but are effectively unrelated to discount factors for
the untailored group.
Table 5 provides corresponding logit regressions showing a significant positive relationship
between discounting and completion only for the tailored group of subjects. Table 2 also
provides actual and predicted completion rates separately for tailored and untailored subjects.
The two groups are predicted to differ in their completion rates due to different contract terms45,
and they indeed do differ in the predicted direction. Overall, predicted and actual completion
rates are significantly correlated, as those individuals who actually do fail were predicted to do
so with higher probability, 0.521 (s.e. = 0.002) vs 0.509 (0.002), t335 = 3.80, (p < 0.01).
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4 Robustness Tests and Additional Exercises
The analysis to this point indicates three key findings. First, there appears to be a present bias
in vaccinator allocation behavior. Those individuals making Immediate choice allocate fewer
44Though based on a linear probability model, this fitted value is restricted to be the expectation conditional
on being in the interval (0,1).
45Due to the random uniform assignment the untailored group has relatively more interest rates above 1.
46For the Tailoring sample alone, these values are 0.520 (s.e. = 0.003) vs 0.512 (0.002), t278 = 2.30, (p < 0.05)
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Table 5: Tailoring, Discount Factors, and Completion
Dependent variable: Drive 2 Completed (=1)
Untailored Tailored
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Drive 1 Discount Factor 0.693 0.152 2.506** 2.312**
(1.049) (1.086) (1.043) (1.069)
Constant -0.533 0.118 -2.780** -2.516**
(1.082) (1.131) (1.120) (1.150)
# Vaccinators 138 132 142 135
Log-Likeliihood -94.908 -90.254 -95.022 -91.078
Exclude 99th and 1st Percentiles No Yes No Yes
Actual Completion Rate 0.543 0.568 0.458 0.474
Predicted Completion Rate 0.524 0.523 0.508 0.508
Notes: This table reports logit regressions for successful completion in Drive 2 on Drive 1
discount factor for tailored and untailored subjects. Individual discount factor calculated
from equation (5) based on Drive 1 allocation. Predicted completion rate calculated as
p(vˆ1,i, vˆ2,i) at predicted Drive 2 allocation (vˆ1,i, vˆ2,i). Heteroskedasticity robust White
standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
vaccinations to v1 than those making Advance choice. Second, despite the general tendency
towards less patience in Immediate choice, substantial heterogeneity in discounting is observed.
Both of these effects resonate with prior experimental findings and highlight the potential for
policy interventions tailored to individual preferences. Third, tailored contracts work. Those
individuals given a tailored interest rate equal to their previously measured discount factor
provide smoother service than untailored controls. Furthermore, our tailored contracts generate
additional predictions with regards to completion probabilities which are also borne out in the
data. In the following sub-sections, we explore robustness to a set of plausible alternative
interpretations and provide a set of natural additional examinations.
4.1 Repeated Measurement and Within-Subject Variation
In Drive 1, when relying on between subjects tests, statistical tests of present bias fall at the cusp
of significance. Given the wide heterogeneity in observed patience regardless of decision timing,
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one may fail to statistically identify present bias even if it exists on average. Indeed, most studies
of present bias and dynamic inconsistency are conducted as within-subject exercises with more
choices, potentially because of such wide heterogeneity.
Fortunately, our failed Drive 0 and the corresponding re-randomization in Drive 1 allows
us to identify present bias using both more data and within-subject variation for vaccinators
who changed from Advance to Immediate choice (or vice versa) across drives. Appendix Table
A.3, reconducts the analysis of Table 3, columns (1) and (2) using this augmented data set.
First, we analyze all potential observations, drawing from 622 choices made by 390 vaccinators
in either Drive 0 or Drive 1.47 There, we estimate β = 0.903 (clustered s.e. = 0.030) and reject
the null hypothesis of no present bias at all conventional levels, χ2(1) = 10.571, (p = 0.001)
when controlling for probabilistic completion. The estimated degree of present bias corresponds
closely with other recent estimates of working over time from laboratory studies Augenblick et
al. (2015); Augenblick and Rabin (2015). Examining, only our panel of 232 individuals who
participated in both Drive 0 and Drive 1, a similar estimate is obtained β = 0.931 (0.032),
χ2(1) = 4.497, (p = 0.034). This significant degree of present bias is driven by within-subject
variation. For those individuals who transition from Advance to Immediate Choice or vice-
versa across drives we find β = 0.912 (0.042), and reject the null hypothesis of no present
bias χ2(1) = 4.344, (p = 0.037). As with our aggregate estimates, when identifying only from
between-subject variation, though present bias is of similar magnitude, precision remains an
issue.
Repeated measurement from our panel of subjects provide for two additional analyses. First,
the 126 subjects who change from Advance to Immediate choice provide an opportunity to
investigate present bias at the individual level. Following equation (4), we calculate a discount
factor for each condition the vaccinator faces. The parameter δ is identified as the discount
factor from Advance choice while β is identified as the discount factor from Immediate choice
divided by that of Advance choice. Interestingly, as in our analysis of discount factors, we find
47Only Drive 1 completion data is used to estimate the completion function given the noted cell network
issues that generated the challenges for Drive 1.
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δ is centered around 1 with a median value of 1.04, and that β is skewed below 1 with a median
value of 0.95. Sixty-nine (54.8%) of 126 vaccinators have β < 1, 6 (4.8%) have β = 1, and 51
(40.5%) have β > 1. A sign test for the null hypothesis that the median β is equal to 1 yields a
p-value of 0.12 (two-sided test).48 Together, these results show that general patterns of present
bias are observed at the aggregate and individual level when investigating only within-subject
variation in a sub-sample of 126 vaccinators who change between Advance to Immediate choice
across conditions. See Figure A.9 for graphical detail.
Second, for the 106 vaccinators who maintain their Advance or Immediate choice assignment,
we have two discount factor measures from Drive 0 and Drive 1. One-hundred five of these
subjects also participated in Drive 2. An important question for such subjects is what is
the additional value of having a second measure of preferences. Are improved predictions of
behavior made? To answer this question, we derive the predicted value of v1,i for the preferences
identified in Drive 0 and Drive 1.49 In Appendix Table A.4, we regress the actual allocation
on predicted allocations separately for tailored and untailored subjects. For tailored subjects,
there appears to be little additional value of incorporating the Drive 0 measures, while for
untailored subjects the Drive 0 measures are even more predictive than those in Drive 1. In
either case, the value added of additional measures is limited as the R-squared obtained with
the single more predictive measure is over 95% of that obtained with both. This suggests
that the marginal value of additional observations (particularly for those we attempt to tailor)
declines rather sharply in this context.
48For the one-sided test with an alternative of β < 1, the p-value is 0.06. Excluding a single subject with β
in excess of 19 reduces the two-sided (one-sided) p-value to 0.10 (0.05).
49Following equation (4), the predicted allocation to v1 is calculated as
vˆ1,i =
(β1d=1,iδ)i
R2
1 + (β
1d=1,iδ)i
R2
.
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4.2 Structural Assumptions
As in any structural exercise, a set of assumptions are required to infer discounting parameters
from vaccinator allocation behavior. Six assumptions are relevant for the present discussion,
which we discuss below.
Assumption 1: Stationarity of the Cost Function: We assume the cost function is the same for
day 1 and day 2. If sooner costs are forecasted to be more severe than later costs, vaccinators
may appear disproportionately impatient, while if later costs are forecasted to be more severe,
they may appear disproportionately patient. Further, if perceived costliness of vaccinations
changes from Advance to Immediate choice, present bias measured by β is conflated with non-
stationarity.
Importantly, our monitoring technology provides time-stamps and geo-stamps for vacci-
nation activity. Time stamps are recorded every vaccination attempt, while geo-stamps are
collected approximately every 10 vaccination attempts. This may provide independent means
for assessing the costliness of tasks from time use. For each vaccinator, we identify the median
time lapse between vaccination attempts and the median distance covered per 30 minute win-
dow each day.50 Of our 338 vaccinators, measures for median time lapse between vaccination
attempts are available for 277 on either Day 1 or Day 2 and for 228 vaccinators on both days
of Drive 1.51 Of our 338 vaccinators, measures for median distance traveled every 15 minutes
50We focus only on the distance traveled and time taken for vaccinations between 8 am and 6pm each day.
The distribution of time taken and distance traveled carried some extreme outliers for some subjects. As such,
we felt the median was an appropriate summary statistic. Though we had expected to receive geo-stamp data
approximately every 10 vaccination attempts, when the monitoring data arrived we noted substantial variance
in the number of vaccinations with common geo-stamps and sequences of geo-stamps which ‘bounced’ back and
forth between geographic coordinates. In order to not overstate subject movements, we opted to take average
coordinates within a 15 minute window and calculate direct-line distance between window-average coordinates
as our measures of distance.
51265 vaccinators have Day 1 lapse data while 240 have Day 2 lapse data. Of the 73 vaccinators with missing
Day 1 data, 68 completed either zero or one vaccination on Day 1 such that time lapse between vaccination
attempts is not calculable. The remaining 5 conducted vaccinations but did not have phones that interacted
with the server to report time use. Of the 98 vaccinators with missing Day 2 data, 92 of them completed either
zero or one vaccination on Day 2 and the remaining 6 did not have phones that interacted with the server to
report time use. Those vaccinators who completed vaccinations but did not have interaction with the server
had their vaccination records pulled manually from their phones after the drive.
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are available for 274 on either Day 1 or Day 2 and for 226 vaccinators on both days of Drive
1.52
Vaccinators take around 3.4 minutes between vaccination attempts and walk around 0.06
miles per 15 minutes on Day 1. Focusing on individuals with measures on both days of the
drive, we find that time taken and distance traveled are uncorrelated both with Advance
choice and with discount factors within condition. Time and distance are also uncorrelated
with Advance choice and discount factors on Day 2 of the drive. Further, differences in
time taken or distance walked are statistically indistinguishable from zero, uncorrelated
with allocation timing, and uncorrelated with discount factors within condition. These data
indicate stability in required average effort per vaccination which is unrelated to assignment
to Advance or Immediate choice, and that changes in efficacy are unrelated to measured
preferences. This suggests that perceived changes in costs likely do not drive our measures of
patience or our finding of present bias.53 These results are all presented in Appendix Table A.5.
Assumption 2: Unobserved Idiosyncratic Costs: We assume that vaccinations are the only
argument of costs when identifying time preferences. However, there may be idiosyncratic costs
across time or individuals that could influence measured patience. For example, a vaccinator
with an appointment lasting 2 hours on Day 1 and no appointments on Day 2 may find it
extremely costly to allocate vaccinations to Day 1. This may appear to the researcher as
impatience, but only reflects the vaccinator’s idiosyncratic costs across days. Further, if such
idiosyncratic events are easier to re-organize when making Advance choice, present bias may
be conflated with ease of scheduling.
52257 vaccinators have Day 1 distance data while 240 have Day 2 distance data. Of the 81 vaccinators with
missing Day 1 data, 75 completed four or fewer vaccination attempts on Day 1 such that distance traveled
between 15 minute windows is not calculable. The remaining 6 conducted vaccinations but either did not have
phones that interacted with the server to report location or had faulty Global Position Systems (GPS) in their
phones. Of the 98 vaccinators with missing Day 2 data, 96 of them completed four or fewer vaccination attempts
on Day 2 and the remaining 2 did not have phones that interacted with the server to report location or had
faulty GPS.
53Ultimately, such stationarity is likely to be expected given that vaccinators are already well-versed in
vaccination procedures, have an average of 10.5 years of experience as vaccinators, and received a half day’s
training on the vaccination monitoring application.
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Here, again, the additional data on vaccinator time use available from the monitoring
application is potentially valuable. We can investigate whether extended periods of non-
vaccination exist and if they are correlated with measured preferences and allocation timing.
As in the example above, a vaccinator with an extended period of non-vaccination may well
be experiencing forecasted idiosyncratic costs unrelated to vaccinations. Appendix Table A.6
repeats the analysis from Appendix Table A.5, with dependent variables of the maximum
daily time lapse between vaccination attempts and whether the longest daily break is in
excess of two hours. Longest daily breaks are, on average, around 59 minutes on Day 1 with
around 13% of vaccinators taking longest breaks in excess of 2 hours. Focusing on individuals
with measures on both days of the drive, we find that the length of longest breaks and the
probability of 2 hour breaks are uncorrelated with Advance choice and uncorrelated with
discount factors within condition. Almost identical patterns are observed on Day 2 of the
drive. Differences in break behavior across days are statistically indistinguishable from zero,
uncorrelated with allocation timing, and uncorrelated with discount factors within condition.
These data suggest that idiosyncratic costs identified from taking extended breaks do not
explain the extent of impatience in the sample, and that potential difficulties in rescheduling
do not explain observed present bias.
Assumption 3: Probabilistic Completion: Our exercise assumes that indivduals know the map-
ping from vaccinations to completion probabilities and trade off discounted marginal costs
and marginal failure probabilities. Two important functional form assumptions inform our
development. First, we assume the failure probability (known to the vaccinator) is given by
p(v1, v2) =
1
αv1
1
αv2
. In Appendix Table A.7, we reconduct the analysis of Table 3, Panel A with
two alternate functional forms for p(v1, v2). First, we assume p(v1, v2) =
1
1+α′(v21+v
2
2)
. Second,
we assume p(v1, v2) =
1
1+α′′(v31+v
3
2)
. Both functional forms carry the property that failure prob-
abilities are declining with the volume of work as long as α′, α′′ > 0. They differ only in the
marginal tradeoffs they entail. Very limited differences are observed in aggregate estimates
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across these functional forms and the one used in the main text. Additionally, when assuming
γ = 2, the pairwise correlations between individual discount factor measures using these three
functional forms all exceed 0.99.
Our exercise additionally restricts the net utility of completion, [δ2u(1000)−vγ1−β1d=1δ ·vγ2 ],
to be equal to 100. In Appendix Table A.8, we reconduct the analysis of Table 3, Panel
A assuming this net utility equal to 1000 or to 10000. Only small changes in the aggregate
estimates are observed. Furthermore, at the individual level when assuming γ = 2, the pairwise
correlations between individual discount factor measures using these three net completion utility
values all exceed 0.99.
Though our exercise assumes individuals know the relationship between allocations
and failure probabilities under a given cost function, a plausible alternative is that costs
are uncertain. The natural evolution of uncertainty through time may lead to differences
in measured preference parameters across groups. Though the resolution of uncertainty
may lead to apparent dynamic inconsistency, the direction is not clear. Some vaccinators
may grow more patient as uncertainty is resolved, some less so. Naturally, if shocks to
costs do underly our observed differences in patience across individuals, one might not ex-
pect to be able to tailor contracts at the individual level over time with the success that we have.
Assumption 4: Identical Cost Functions: Our aggregate exercise assumes identical costs
across subjects, and our individual elicitation assumes identical quadratic costs. Though
these assumptions allow for straightforward estimation and calculation of time preferences,
any violation would lead us to confound differences in patience across individuals or across
allocation timing with differences in costs. One natural view would be to assume that
individuals do not discount at all, δ = 1 and β = 1, such that allocations identify only the
shape of the cost function. In this case, when R = 1, all vaccinators, regardless of allocation
timing, should exhibit v1 = v2 = 150 for all values of γ.
54 Examining the Drive 0 and Drive
54This is because the Euler equation reduces to (v1v2 )
γ = R = 1, which implies v1v2 = 1.
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1 data, we find that for 163 vaccinators who were assigned R = 1, the mean allocation is
v1 = 140.84 (s.d. = 24.76).
55 Though the median allocation is indeed 150, responses range
widely with 5th-95th percentiles of response being 103 to 160. If heterogeneity in costs were
driving response and discounting was not a key feature of the data, one would not expect to
see this extent of variation in response when R = 1. Further, given random assignment to
allocation timing, heterogeneity in costs does not easily rationalize the observed present bias
in the data.
Assumption 5: Only Failure, No Shirking: Our structural exercise assumes individuals know
their likelihood to succeed and work only some minimal amount (e.g., that associated with
the outside option) in the case where their target is not attainable. Appendix Figure A.6
demonstrates the plausibility of this assumption with a bimodal pattern of almost complete
success and almost complete failure. Another possibility is that subjects find an alternate way
to renege on their contracts by shirking and still receiving pay. Not all vaccination attempts
are equally challenging. In Appendix Figure A.7 we plot for each half-hour of Drive 1 the
total number of attempted vaccinations along with the probability of successful vaccination
and the probability that no child was reported as present. Reporting that no child was present
is likely to be less time consuming than a successful vaccination and easier to falsify. The
vast majority of vaccination activity occurs before 3:00pm, there exists no sharp uptick in
activity as days end, and we find evidence that vaccinators’ proportion of successful or failed
vaccination attempts remains largely steady throughout the workday. This suggests that
allocated vaccination attempts are conducted with due diligence.
Assumption 6: No Biases in Choice: Our study assumes that the allocation environment
itself induces no biases in choice such that vaccinator allocations are directly informative of
preferences. A substantial literature in experimental economics suggests that aspects of the
5542 of 163 vaccinators allocated exactly v1 = v2 = 150.
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decision environment may deeply influence measures of preferences (for recent examples, see
Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom and Sullivan, 2005; Beauchamp, Benjamin, Chabris and Laibson,
2015). One common view is that subjects are biased towards the middle of a choice set. In
our environment, this could involve subjects opting for either equal allocations of v1 = v2,
or choosing an allocation in the middle of their budget constraint, v1 = Rv2. Only 31 of 338
vaccinators (9%) exhibit v1 = v2. Taking a less conservative measure of v2−2.5 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 +2.5,
we find that still only 58 of 338 vaccinators (17%) are within 5 vaccinations of v1 = v2.
56 Only 35
of 338 vaccinators (10.3%) exhibit v1 = Rv2. Taking a less conservative measure of Rv2−2.5 ≤
v1 ≤ Rv2 +2.5, we find that 83 of 338 vaccinators (25%) are within 5 vaccinations of v1 = Rv2.57
Taken together, this suggests that biases towards the middle of the budget constraint or towards
equal allocation are unlikely to be driving substantial portions of allocation behavior.
4.3 Tailoring Robustness Tests
Our Drive 2 data show that vaccinators who are given bonus contracts with a value of R equal
to their estimated discount factors provide significantly smoother service. Here we examine
robustness of this result to alternative comparison groups, alternative measures for smoothness
in service provision, and alternative measures for treatment. We conclude the section by pro-
viding results from a set of additional exercises assessing the value of atheoretic approaches to
tailoring, and the possibility for alternative interventions based on different policy preferences.
4.3.1 Alternative Comparison Groups
Our results demonstrate that, relative to a comparison group with uniform random values of R,
tailoring serves to reduce distance to the policy target by around one-third. A natural question
is whether these tailoring benefits are observed relative to alternative controls. In Appendix
Table A.9, we present three additional analyses. A first natural control is the use of a single
value of R applied to all individuals. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare only a single
56As an even less conservative measure, 145 of 338 (43%) satisfy v2 − 10 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 + 10.
57As an even less conservative measure, 137 of 338 (40.5%) satsify Rv2 − 10 ≤ v1 ≤ Rv2 + 10.
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value of R given our uniform random assignment protocol. However, we can examine a section
of the untailored group around a given value. In column (1) of Table A.9, we repeat the analysis
of Table 4, column (3), but use as the comparison group only those untailored vaccinators who
received a value of R within one standard deviation of their group’s mean R∗i of 1.036. Tailoring
continues to decrease the distance from smooth provision relative to this more limited control
group. In column (2), we repeat this analysis excluding those individuals from the untailored
group who randomly received a value of R˜i within 0.10 of their true value of R
∗
i . The benefits
of tailoring are observed with increased precision.58 A second potential control group would be
a subset of the untailored group who receive the same distribution of R as those in the tailored
group. Matching on the 1st, 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th and 99th percentiles, column (3)
demonstrates that relative to a control group receiving a matched distribution of R, tailoring
continues to significantly reduce the distance from smooth provision.
4.3.2 Tailoring and Completion
Our analysis to here treats probabilistic completion through the lens of a structural model
and attempts to assess the trade-off between marginal completion probabilities and discounted
marginal costs. Though this analysis seems both tractable and yields valuable predictive in-
sights, an alternative interpretation for failure exists. If the outcome of failure is perfectly
forecasted by the vaccinator, there is no incentive to respond truthfully. As such, the targets
set in Drive 1 and our corresponding inference on time preferences would be systematically inac-
curate for individuals expecting to fail. In effect, successful vaccinators are allocating according
to equation (1), while unsuccessful vaccinators are providing only noisy response. Under this
assumption, we should be dramatically less able to predict allocation behavior for vaccinators
who fail in Drive 1.
Table A.10 repeats the analysis of Table 4, columns (1) through (3) separately for subject
58Comparing tailored individuals to those who received close to the untailored group’s mean value of R∗i is
important because, in principle, the mean value of R∗i should yield smooth provision for the average subject.
Not only is the average distance for these comparison groups substantial, 0.132 to 0.150, but the tailoring yields
additional benefits at the individual level by leveraging the heterogeneity in discount factors across vaccinators.
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who completed and failed to complete their Drive 1 targets. Similar magnitude effects are
observed for both sets of subjects, with tailoring serving to reduce distance from the equal
provision by around one third. Focusing only on the completing subjects, we would reach
effectively the same conclusion as our initial analysis. Furthermore, the fact that predictive
accuracy remains for subjects who fail to complete demonstrates that there is content to the
allocations subjects make regardless of ex-post completion.
4.3.3 Alternative Measures for Smooth Provision
Our analysis measures the distance to equal provision using the metric |v1,i
v2,i
− 1|. In Table
A.11, we reconduct the analysis of Table 4, using five alternate measures for smoothness.
Panel A presents the Euclidean distance to the 45 degree line,
|v1,i−v2,i|√
2
. Panel B presents
the Euclidean distance normalized by the total number of vaccinations allocated,
|v1,i−v2,i|√
2(v1,i+v2,i)
.
Panel C presents the number of sooner vaccinations that would need to be reallocated to reach
the 45 degree line, |v1,i − 3001+R |. Panel D presents probit regressions for needing to reallocate
more than 25 vaccinations, |v1,i − 3001+R | > 25. And finally, Panel E presents the value of the
policymaker’s objective function, min[v1,i, v2,i]. Across all specifications, the main conclusions
are reproduced. However, the results with respect to additional tailoring benefits in Immediate
choice fall, at times, outside the range of statistical significance. These alternative measures
of smooth provision indicate that our results on the potential benefits of tailoring are not an
artifact of how one measures the outcome of interest.
4.3.4 Alternative Sample Restrictions and Treatment Measures
Our tailoring exercise focused on vaccinators with discount factors between 0.75 and 1.5. Of
337 vaccinators in Drive 2, 280 satisfied this requirement. Those vaccinators whose discount
factors fell outside of this range were given either R = 0.75 or 1.5 depending on which bound
they were closest to. For such individuals, tailoring is not a binary treatment, but rather a
continuous difference between their discount factor and the exogenously given one. Indeed,
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for all vaccinators in the untailored group, treatment is also a continuous measure. In Table
A.12, Panel A, we reconduct the analysis of Table 4 using as the measure of treatment the
absolute difference between each vaccinator’s discount factor and their assigned interest rate,
which we label Tailor Intensity. The main results are reproduced; the closer discount factors
are to interest rates, the smoother is provision.59 In Panel B, we include those individuals
in the Boundary Sample with discount factors that lie outside of the bounds of interest rate
assignment. Including these observations does not alter the conclusions; however, it should be
noted that treatment is no longer orthogonal to individual preferences as extremely patient and
impatient vaccinators will receive larger treatment intensity on average.60
4.3.5 Atheoretic Approaches
Our exercise demonstrates that structural estimates of time preferences can be useful in pre-
dicting subsequent behavior. An alternative to developing a structural model of choice would
rely on the researcher recovering the relationship between key parameters of interest, R and
1d=1, and behavior, and developing a subsequent prediction without filtering the relationship
through the structural model.
We examine one example of such an exercise. For Drive 1 behavior, we recover the rela-
tionship between v1 and R and 1d=1 by conducting a Least Absoluate Shrinkage and Selection
Operator (LASSO) regression with penalty parameter chosen via 10-fold cross validation (Tib-
shirani, 1996) of v1 on a cubic polynomial in R interacted with 1d=1.
61 The corresponding
selected lasso coefficients deliver an atheoretic representation of the most predictive (in terms
of cross-validated mean squared error) relationship between v1 and key parameters of interest in
Drive 1. Given the values of R and 1d=1 provided in Drive 2 and the Drive 1 lasso coefficients,
59Restricting attention only to the untailored group reveals directionally similar, though insignificant, results
across all specifications.
60Using the indicator for tailoring would not be an appropriate solution to this problem as tailored vaccinators
with extreme patience or impatience may actually receive interest rates that are further from their policy-optimal
interest rates than those in the untailored condition.
61The provided regressors are a constant and normalized values of R,R2, R3,1d=1, R× 1d=1, R2 × 1d=1, and
R3×1d=1. The lasso regression and cross-fold validation procedure were implemented using the glmnet package
in R.
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we predict the Drive 2 value of v1 for each individual.
62 Similarly, we predict Drive 2 value
of v1 from the assigned values of R and 1d=1 and the individual discount factor identified in
Drive 1 from equation (4). In Appendix Figure A.10 we examine the predictive validity of the
structural versus the non-structural approaches by plotting predicted and actual values of v1 in
Drive 2 for the 337 subjects who participated in both Drive 1 and Drive 2. We also provide non-
parametric lowess curves for the relationship between predicted and actual values.63 Notable
from Appendix Figure A.10 is the generally close adherence between structurally predicted and
actual values. The lowess line follows the 45 degree line of perfect prediction through the ma-
jority of the space. Less adherence is observed between non-structural predictions and actual
behavior. The structural predictions deliver higher correlations with real behavior (ρ = 0.18)
than do the non-structural predictions (ρ = 0.16) and lower bias in prediction (27.9 vs. 32).
However, the root mean squared error is lower for the non-structural predictions (32.8 vs 39.1).
Hence, on the basis of bias and correlation, our structural exercise outperforms the machine
learning lasso algorithm trained on Drive 1.
There is an additional important difference between the LASSO and structural predictions
presented here. The structural prediction for a given vaccinator’s behavior in Drive 2 derives
from their allocation in Drive 1 and the interest rate assigned in Drive 2. It therefore relies on
a single data point. By contrast, the LASSO prediction for a given vaccinator is derived by
training a model on the entire cross-section of data from Drive 1, and then obtaining a fitted
value based on the interest rate assigned in Drive 2. This means the LASSO prediction will
be identical for all subjects assigned the same interest rate while the structural prediction may
vary depending on individually measured preferences. Hence, the two methods are not only
different in the sense of being structural or atheoretic, they also differ both in the amount of
data informing the prediction and in the extent of heterogeneity they can predict.
62Note that this prediction will be identical for all vaccinators given the same value of R and 1d=1, and hence
will mispredict any heterogeneity across vaccinators.
63The lasso procedure on Drive 1 selects an intercept and R as delivering coefficients of sufficient size given
the cross-validated constraint choice.
51
4.3.6 Alternative Policy Preferences
While our results suggest that tailored contracts can improve success in achieving a Leontief
policy objective, a natural question is whether this approach could be put to use to achieve
other policy objectives. Ultimately, any attempt to tailor contracts will rely on whether ini-
tially elicited preferences are stable. If vaccinator time preferences are stable, then changes in
incentives will have predictable effects on behavior.
To provide a general assessment of the promise of alternative policy objectives, we examine
the stability of identified discount factors across Drives 1 and 2 by calculating the corresponding
discount factor from equation (4) for each vaccinator in each Drive. Figure A.11 presents the
calculated discount factors for Drive 1 and Drive 2 along with the 45 degree line for 317 of
337 vaccinators.64 The correlation in discount factors across rounds is ρ = 0.41, (p < 0.01),
indicating stability in preferences.65 Our findings correspond with those of Meier and Sprenger
(2015), who investigate subjects participating in an identical monetary discounting experiment
approximately one year apart and identify a one-year correlation of around 0.5 for monetary
choices. The level of correlation in discount factors across drives indicates stability in preferences
such that alternative policy objectives may also be achievable with tailored contracts.66
5 Conclusion
Structural parameters for intertemporal preferences have been at the center of theoretical and
empirical research modeling intertemporal choice for much of the last century. This paper
64Eliminated from the figure and from our calculations of stability are 20 vaccinators with discount factors
in excess of two in one or both drives.
65Including the remaining 20 extreme vaccinators, the correlation changes substantially to ρ = 0.01, (p =
0.87). It should be noted that the correlation in identified discount factors is substantially higher in the tailored
condition, ρ = 0.67, (p < 0.01), relative to the untailored condition, ρ = 0.17, (p < 0.05). We believe this is due
to some sensitivity of behavior to extreme values of R in Drive 2. For untailored subjects who coincidentally
receive a value of R˜i within 0.25 of their value of R
∗
i , the correlation in discount factors is ρ = 0.53, (p < 0.01).
66One natural alternative is to maximize performance, regardless of timing. In such a case, we consider a
policymaker with linear preferences, P (v1, v2) = v1 +v2, who wishes to maximize the total number of completed
vaccinations regardless of timing. Maximizing this objective function subject to the vaccinator’s offer curve,
yields an optimal R∗max =
√
β1t=1δ(1 + β1t=1δ)− β1t=1δ. Unfortunately, our assigned values of R are generally
quite far from R∗max making it difficult to test for the possibility of a maximizing contract.
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seeks to understand a heretofore unexplored question: are the out-of-sample predictions given
by structural estimates of discounting empirically valid? We couch this question in an effort to
customize contracts for 337 vaccination workers who spend two days each month attempting
to deliver polio vaccines in the neighborhoods of Lahore, Pakistan.
We monitor our workers’ efforts using a smartphone application developed especially for our
project. Workers in the Advanced condition state their targets for both days of the vaccination
drive on the Friday before the drive, which is conducted on the following Monday and Tuesday.
Those in the Immediate condition wait until Monday morning to state their targets. Those
who reach their targets get a 1000 rupee bonus (around $10 US). As anticipated, subjects
stating targets on Monday morning are skewed to delaying vaccinations until day 2 of the
drive. That is, vaccinators exhibit a present bias in effort allocations. With assumptions on
costs of delivering vaccines we are able to identify (somewhat rough) estimates of discounting
parameters for each of our workers. In the second stage of our study, conducted a month later,
half of workers were offered a contract tailored to their own discounting parameters, designed to
induce equal provision of vaccinations on both days of the drive. The initial preference measures
are critical to the design of these contracts as, without a measure of preferences, there would
be no prescription for contract terms. The policy objective of equal provision of vaccinations
on both days is admittedly arbitrary. Hence, we view our exercise as a proof-of-concept for the
possibility of tailored incentives.
Our findings are encouraging. Those workers who receive effort contracts that were tailored
to their individual discounting parameters were significantly more likely to meet the policy
objective relative to untailored workers. That is, using structurally identified estimates of
discounting parameters to form a new incentive contract can indeed have a predictable effect on
allocation behavior. Additional predictions for subsequent task completion from our structural
analysis are also borne out in the data. To date, little research makes use of such predictive value
of structural discounting estimates. Our results show not only that estimates are predictive, but
also that useful parameter estimates are identifiable from a very limited number of experimental
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choices. This suggests that the substantial effort of articulating and estimating structural
models in this domain has been well-invested.
This paper also speaks to a recent discussion on the external validity of experimentally ad-
ministered randomized control trials. Developing structural models through which to interpret
experimental treatment effects potentially provides a means for generalizing results to other
settings (Acemoglu, 2010; Banerjee, Chassang and Snowberg, 2016).67 In our setting, trans-
lating from our reduced form experimental treatment effects to a structural model of choice
requires a set of potentially strong (and implausible) assumptions.68 Nonetheless, the findings
of predictive validity in this case suggests there is indeed potential for using structure as a
means of increasing the external validity of results obtained from a single sample.
Separately, our results link to the growing literature on the personnel economics of the state
(Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee, 2015; Bertrand et al., 2016; Finan, Olken and Pande, Forthcoming;
Dal Bo´, Finan and Rossi, 2013; Deseranno, 2016; Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain, Khan and Rezaee,
2016). This literature emphasizes the idea that states play a vital role in delivering services
and facilitating economic growth, and so their internal dynamics should be studied with the
same degree of attention as has been applied to firms. Within this literature, there is interest
in understanding whether heterogeneity in competencies and in motivation of state actors is
linked to meaningful differences in state performance or service provsion (Ashraf et al., 2015;
Dal Bo´ et al., 2013; Deseranno, 2016; Callen et al., 2016). We take the additional step of
asking not only whether this heterogeneity matters for outcomes, but also whether it can be
acknowledged and reflected in the design of individual incentives.
There are a number of clear limitations to our study which should be addressed by future
research. First, our study sidesteps the critical issue of incentive compatibility by not informing
subjects of Drive 2 when Drive 1 preferences are elicited. The mechanism design problem of
eliciting preferences and tailoring on said preferences with complete information will be critical
67Attanasio and Meghir (2012), Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2012), and Duflo, Greenstone, Pande and Ryan
(2016) provide examples in development of using experiments to estimate key policy parameters.
68Banerjee et al. (2016) discuss how the plausibility of such identifying assumptions might limit external
validity.
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if one wishes to implement tailored contracts repeatedly in the field. Second, future research
should seek to gain more precise estimates of preferences. Our exercise requires restrictive
assumptions that could be relaxed in the presence of more data. If our results point to a lower
bound in the promise of tailored contracts, it is important to know how much more can be
achieved. Third, alternative policy objectives and contract types should be investigated to
ensure robustness of the identified predictive validity. Our findings have natural extensions to
piece rate contracts, multi-period settings, and alternative policy targets that are worthy of
study.
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Figure A.1: Map Given to Vaccinators to Plan Route
66
Figure A.2: Picture of a Door-to-Door Vaccination During a Drive
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Figure A.7: Drive 1 Vaccination Activity
Notes: The solid light grey circles are the share of all vaccination attempts that reflect a successful vaccination during the indicated
hour. The hollow dark black circles are the share of all vaccination attempts that report no children being available during the
attempt. These quantities are compared against the left axis. The dotted line indicates the total number of vaccination attempts
for all vaccinators in the sample. This quantity is compared against the right axis.
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Figure A.8: Predicted and Actual Experimental Response
Notes: Points in the plots are medians for each of the eight treatment groups respectively. Panel A depicts the Full Sample and
Panel B depicts the tailoring sample (vaccinators with R∗ < 0.75 or R∗ > 1.5). Black are advance choice groups and gray are
immediate choice groups. The series for predictions correspond to Table 3, column (2).
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Figure A.10: Structural and Non-Structural Prediction
Notes: Predicted and actual Drive 2 value of v1 for structural and non-structural models. Structural prediction based on individual
discount factor calculated from Drive 1. Non-structural prediction based on lasso regression of v1 on cubic polynomial in R
interacted with 1d=1 from Drive 1. Lowess curves for non-parametric adherence to 45-degree line of perfect prediction.
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Figure A.11: Stability of Preferences
Notes: Drive 1 and Drive 2 discount factors calculated from equation (4) for each allocation. Figure includes 317 of 337 vaccinators
present in both drives. Excluded are 20 vaccinators with calculated discount factors in excess of 2 in one or both drives. Correlation:
ρ = 0.41, (p < 0.01).
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A.2 Appendix Tables
Table A.1: No Allocation Provided in Drive 0
Allocation Provided No Allocation Provided p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Gender (Female = 1) 0.965 1.000 0.082
(0.020) (0.000)
Years of Education 10.294 10.146 0.608
(0.220) (0.185)
Number of Children 3.268 3.388 0.695
(0.239) (0.188)
Punjabi (=1) 0.952 0.975 0.440
(0.023) (0.018)
Has a Savings Account (=1) 0.317 0.305 0.867
(0.052) (0.051)
Participated in a Rosca (=1) 0.446 0.378 0.380
(0.055) (0.054)
Years in Health Department 10.135 10.886 0.337
(0.554) (0.547)
Years as Polio Vaccinator 9.994 10.531 0.467
(0.538) (0.502)
# Vaccinators 86 82
Notes: This table tests whether the failure of the smartphone app during Drive 0 was systematic. Standard
errors reported in parentheses. Column 3 reports a p-value corresponding to the null that the mean in the
Did Not Fail group is equal to the Failed group.
77
Table A.2: Aggregate Drive 0 and 1 Behavior
Dependent variable: Tasks Allocated to the First Day of the Drive (v1)
Full Sample Tailoring Sample
(1) (2)
Median Median
Immediate Decision (=1) -2.00** -3.00***
(0.95) (0.88)
Interest Rate (R) -40.00*** -60.00***
(6.04) (4.12)
Constant 188.00*** 210.00***
(6.06) (4.34)
Median Advance Choice 150 150
# Observations 622 475
Notes: This table reports on the effects of making Immediate allocation decisions and interest
rate on Drive 0 and Drive 1 vaccinations allocated to the first day of the drive. Median regression
coefficients with standard errors reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
vaccinator level. Clustered standard errors for quantile regressions are calculated using the
approach in Parente and Santos Silva (2016). Immediate Decision is an indicator equal to one
for vaccinators selecting their allocations on the morning of the vaccination drive. The interest
rate R takes the values R ∈ {0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.25}. Levels of Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
Table A.3: Within Subject Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Panel Panel Panel
Observations Only No Change Change
β 0.895 0.903 0.930 0.931 0.946 0.944 0.906 0.912
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042)
δ 0.979 0.979 0.988 0.988 0.967 0.967 1.012 1.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
α 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0 : β = 1. (χ
2(1)) 12.375 10.571 4.624 4.497 1.283 1.399 4.895 4.344
[p-value] [0.000] [0.001] [0.032] [0.034] [0.257] [0.237] [0.027] [0.037]
Criterion Value 0.182 0.191 0.198 0.200 0.175 0.177 0.217 0.221
# Observations 622 622 464 464 212 212 252 252
# Vaccinators 390 390 232 232 106 106 126 126
Notes: This reports structural estimates of β, δ, and α obtained using minimum distance estimation of equations
(1) in even columns or (2) and (3) in odd columns. Estimates provided for either all possible observations or panel
of individuals participating in both Failed Drive 0 and Drive 1. Only Drive 1 data used for estimation of completion
parameter, α. Standard errors clustered on individual level are reported in parentheses. Test statistic for β = 1 with
p-value in brackets.
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Table A.4: Additional Discounting Measures
Dependent variable: Drive 2 Allocation to Sooner Date v1,i
Untailored Tailored
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Drive 0 Prediction 0.339* 0.203** 0.009 -0.017
(0.174) (0.081) (0.066) (0.068)
Drive 1 Prediction -0.108 -0.051 0.406* 0.701***
(0.187) (0.137) (0.212) (0.182)
Constant 109.010*** 122.367*** 83.530*** 43.805**
(13.592) (14.128) (24.742) (20.610)
# Vaccinators 52 42 53 46
Tailoring Sample No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.275 0.165 0.166 0.362
R-Squared (Drive 0 Prediction Alone) 0.262 0.162 0.103 0.175
R-Squared (Drive 1 Prediction Alone) 0.037 0.070 0.166 0.361
Notes: This table reports regressions for Drive 2 allocation on Drive 0 or Drive 1 predicted allocation for
panel of 105 individuals that remain in either Advance or Immediate choice across Drives 0 and 1. Predicted
allocation from equation (4) individual discount factor. Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors
reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Testing Stationarity of Costs Across Days
Panel A: Time Lapse Between Vaccinations (in minutes)
Dependent variable: Day 1 Med. Time Lapse Day 2 Med. Time Lapse Day 1 - Day 2 Med. Time Lapse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advance Choice (=1) 0.519 1.134 1.011 -0.910 -1.161 -0.829 2.295 1.840
(2.492) (1.163) (1.045) (3.164) (3.324) (3.182) (3.527) (3.343)
Discount Factor -3.697 10.004 -13.701
(3.504) (8.247) (9.000)
Constant 3.370* 1.422*** 5.337 4.447* 4.540* -6.053 -3.118 11.390
(1.851) (0.084) (3.708) (2.372) (2.501) (6.558) (2.501) (7.581)
R-Squared 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.022
# Observations 265 228 228 240 228 228 228 228
Panel B: Distance Walked Between Vaccinations (in Kilometers)
Dependent variable: Day 1 Med. Distance Day 2 Med. Distance Day 1 - Day 2 Med. Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advance Choice (=1) 0.112 0.146 0.132 -0.148 -0.171 -0.154 0.317 0.286
(0.144) (0.154) (0.139) (0.152) (0.161) (0.144) (0.223) (0.199)
Discount Factor -0.444 0.509 -0.953
(0.466) (0.516) (0.697)
Constant 0.059** 0.038*** 0.507 0.201 0.201 -0.337 -0.164 0.844
(0.026) (0.010) (0.492) (0.151) (0.161) (0.388) (0.162) (0.629)
R-Squared 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.020 0.009 0.033
# Observations 257 226 226 240 226 226 226 226
Notes: This table reports on the relationship between decision timing and the one period discount factor with two proxies of the
cost of performing a vaccination (the amount of time that lapses between vaccinations and the distance traveled between vaccinations).
Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Testing for Idiosyncratic Shocks
Panel A: Maximum Daily Time Lapse Between Vaccinations (in Minutes)
Dependent variable: Max Day 1 Time Lapse Max Day 2 Time Lapse Day 1 - Day 2 Max Time Lapse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advance Choice (=1) -0.702 0.578 0.739 8.067 5.274 5.574 -4.695 -4.836
(9.783) (9.104) (9.026) (8.885) (9.114) (9.021) (12.319) (12.211)
Discount Factor 4.831 9.054 -4.223
(14.139) (15.570) (19.824)
Constant 59.258*** 54.880*** 49.764*** 53.437*** 54.362*** 44.774*** 0.518 4.990
(7.920) (7.254) (15.266) (5.178) (5.404) (15.351) (8.724) (20.662)
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
# Observations 265 228 228 240 228 228 228 228
Panel B: Maximum Time Lapse > 2 hours
Dependent variable: Max Day 1 Lapse > 2hr. Max Day 2 Time Lapse > 2hr. Day 1 > 2hr. - Day 2 > 2hr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advance Choice (=1) 0.051 0.042 0.044 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.041 0.042
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.060) (0.060)
Discount Factor 0.053 0.032 0.021
(0.077) (0.071) (0.100)
Constant 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.071 0.103*** 0.109*** 0.075 0.018 -0.004
(0.029) (0.032) (0.085) (0.028) (0.030) (0.075) (0.043) (0.111)
R-Squared 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
# Observations 265 228 228 240 228 228 228 228
Notes: This table reports on the relationship between decision timing and the one period discount factor with two proxies for experiencing a shock during
the drive (the maximum time lapse between vaccinations and whether a lapse of more than 2 hours occurred). Heteroskedasticity robust White standard
errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table A.7: Aggregate Parameter Estimates, Alternate Probabilistic Completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ = 2 γ = 2.5 γ = 3 γ = 3.25
p(v1, v2) =
1
1+α′(v21+v
2
2)
1
1+α′′(v31+v
3
2)
1
1+α′(v21+v
2
2)
1
1+α′′(v31+v
3
2)
1
1+α′(v21+v
2
2)
1
1+α′′(v31+v
3
2)
1
1+α′(v21+v
2
2)
1
1+α′′(v31+v
3
2)
β 0.944 0.936 0.935 0.924 0.924 0.910 0.917 0.883
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.053)
δ 0.992 0.992 0.967 0.966 0.943 0.942 0.931 0.926
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028)
α′ 0.000022 0.000022 0.000022 0.000022
(0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002)
α′′ 1.48e−7 1.50e−7 1.50e−7 6.58
(1.63e−8) (1.64e−8) (1.65e−8) (.)
H0 : β = 1. (χ
2(1)) 3.583 4.650 2.700 3.681 2.341 3.299 2.261 4.904
[p-value] [0.058] [0.031] [0.100] [0.055] [0.126] [0.069] [0.133] [0.027]
Criterion Value 0.308 0.306 0.248 0.247 0.211 0.210 0.198 0.551
# Vaccinators 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338
Notes: This reports structural estimates of β, δ, and α obtained using minimum distance estimation of equations (1) in even columns or (2) and
(3) in odd columns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Test statistic for β = 1 with p-value in brackets.
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Table A.8: Aggregate Parameter Estimates, Alternate Net Completion Utility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ = 2 γ = 2.5 γ = 3 γ = 3.25
[δ2u(1000)− vγ1 − β1d=1δ · vγ2 ] = 1000 10000 1000 10000 1000 10000 1000 10000
β 0.952 0.952 0.946 0.946 0.938 0.940 0.934 0.906
(0.029) (0.029) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.053)
δ 0.992 0.996 0.967 0.967 0.942 0.943 0.931 0.915
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
α 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0 : β = 1. (χ
2(1)) 2.644 2.710 1.856 1.855 1.525 1.466 1.425 3.070
[p-value] [0.104] [0.100] [0.173] [0.173] [0.217] [0.226] [0.233] [0.080]
Criterion Value 0.311 0.326 0.249 0.250 0.212 0.212 0.199 0.185
# Vaccinators 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338
Notes: This reports structural estimates of β, δ, and α obtained using minimum distance estimation of equations (1) in even
columns or (2) and (3) in odd columns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Test statistic for β = 1 with p-value in
brackets.
Table A.9: Tailoring with Alternative Controls
Dependent variable: |v1,iv2,i − 1|
Comparison group: Untailored with Untailored with Untailored with
R˜i ∈ +/− 1 s.d of Mean R∗i R˜i ∈ +/− 1 s.d of Mean R∗i Matched Distribution of R˜i
|R∗i − R˜i| > 0.10
(1) (2) (3)
Tailored (=1) -0.039* -0.052** -0.047**
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022)
Constant 0.200*** 0.231*** 0.085
(0.071) (0.074) (0.072)
Stratum FEs Yes Yes Yes
Exclude 99th and 1st Percentiles Yes Yes Yes
Drive 2 R∗i or R˜i Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.081 0.086 0.071
Mean in Untailored Contract 0.132 0.150 0.143
# Vaccinators 194 181 207
# Untailored Vaccinators 59 46 72
Notes: This table reports the effects of tailoring on the equality of effort provision over time. The measure | vtvt+1 − 1| (the percentage difference
between tasks allocated to day 1 and day 2 of the drive) reflects the distance of the task allocation (v1,v2) from equality (v1 = v2). Mean (standard
deviation) R∗i in untailored group = 1.036 (0.165). Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
82
Table A.10: Tailoring and Completion
Dependent variable: |v1,iv2,i − 1|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Completed Drive 1 Failed Drive 1
Tailored (=1) -0.031 -0.055** -0.042* -0.977 -0.075** -0.065**
(0.039) (0.025) (0.024) (0.652) (0.030) (0.029)
Constant 0.100*** 0.114*** -0.051 1.967 0.181*** 0.032
(0.037) (0.032) (0.088) (1.222) (0.030) (0.079)
Stratum FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude 99th and 1st Percentiles No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Drive 2 R∗i or R˜i No No Yes No No Yes
R-Squared 0.051 0.095 0.130 0.045 0.053 0.078
Mean in Untailored Contract 0.151 0.129 0.129 1.161 0.183 0.183
# Vaccinators 147 142 142 133 125 125
Notes: This table reports the effects of tailoring on the equality of effort provision over time. The measure | vtvt+1 −1|
(the percentage difference between tasks allocated to day 1 and day 2 of the drive) reflects the distance of the task
allocation (v1,v2) from equality (v1 = v2). Column (1) reports a regression of this measure on an indicator equal
to one for subjects in the tailored group. Column (2) reports estimates from the same specification excluding
outliers. Column (3) controls for the interest rate assignment in round 2. Column (4) provides estimates on the
same sample as column (1) interacting treatment with being in the immediate choice condition. Columns (5) and
(6) apply the same restrictions to the sample as columns (2) and (3) respectively. Ordinary least squares regressions.
Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Robustness Tests for Tailoring Intertemporal Incentives
Panel A: Dependent variable
|v1,i−v2,i|√
2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailored (=1) -1.758 -4.480** -4.481** -2.401 -1.703 -1.868
(4.588) (1.954) (2.068) (2.302) (2.176) (2.229)
Immediate Choice 20.994*** 10.365*** 10.597***
(5.856) (3.335) (3.449)
Tailored x Immediate 2.127 -6.026 -6.220
(9.793) (4.084) (4.136)
Constant 31.386*** 16.399*** 16.412** 19.464*** 10.992*** 14.128**
(7.334) (2.296) (6.857) (6.433) (2.777) (6.671)
Panel B: Dependent variable
|v1,i−v2,i|√
2(v1,i+v2,i)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailored (=1) -0.014 -0.018*** -0.016** -0.009 -0.007 -0.007
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Immediate Choice 0.080*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.012)
Tailored x Immediate -0.008 -0.024* -0.023*
(0.032) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.103*** 0.057*** 0.033 0.058*** 0.037*** 0.025
(0.023) (0.008) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010) (0.022)
Panel C: Dependent variable |v1,i − 3001+R |
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailored (=1) -2.612 -3.789*** -3.445** -1.959 -1.509 -1.405
(3.282) (1.410) (1.459) (1.643) (1.575) (1.591)
Immediate Choice 16.650*** 7.990*** 7.844***
(4.496) (2.451) (2.509)
Tailored x Immediate -0.867 -4.972* -4.850
(6.891) (2.938) (2.974)
Constant 22.736*** 12.014*** 7.571 13.340*** 7.849*** 5.871
(5.301) (1.682) (4.735) (4.501) (2.048) (4.622)
Panel D: Dependent variable |v1,i − 3001+R | > 25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailored (=1) -0.454** -0.654*** -0.578*** -0.282 -0.282 -0.235
(0.191) (0.221) (0.216) (0.317) (0.314) (0.309)
Immediate Choice 0.920*** 0.720** 0.697**
(0.272) (0.283) (0.286)
Tailored x Immediate -0.275 -0.676 -0.653
(0.408) (0.462) (0.460)
Constant -0.639*** -0.887*** -1.568** -1.231*** -1.312*** -1.812***
(0.206) (0.239) (0.637) (0.304) (0.335) (0.665)
Panel E: Dependent variable min[v1,i, v2,i]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailored (=1) 7.210** 8.112*** 2.540* 4.764* 4.381* 0.843
(3.512) (2.051) (1.416) (2.650) (2.643) (1.567)
Immediate Choice -20.562*** -11.804*** -6.815***
(5.042) (3.492) (2.332)
Tailored x Immediate 4.672 8.194** 4.037
(7.206) (4.052) (2.806)
Constant 126.824*** 136.728*** 208.758*** 138.343*** 142.870*** 210.228***
(5.181) (2.645) (4.541) (4.905) (3.359) (4.433)
Stratum FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude 99th and 1st Percentiles No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Drive 2 R No No Yes No No Yes
# Vaccinators 280 267 267 280 267 267
Notes: This table reports the effects of tailoring on the equality of effort provision over time using several different measures of the
distance of the task allocation (v1,v2) from equality (v1 = v2). Column (1) reports a regression of this measure on an indicator equal
to one for subjects in the tailored group. Column (1) reports a regression of this measure on an indicator equal to one for subjects in
the tailored group. Column (2) reports estimates from the same specification excluding outliers. Column (3) controls for the interest
rate assignment in round 2. Column (4) provides estimates on the same sample as column (1) interacting treatment with being in
the immediate choice condition. Columns (5) and (6) apply the same restrictions to the sample as columns (2) and (3) respectively.
Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Alternate Treatment Measures and Sample Restrictions
Panel A: Tailoring Intensity
Dependent variable: |v1,iv2,i − 1|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailor Intensity 2.521 0.164** 0.110* 0.078 0.124 0.089
(2.057) (0.065) (0.063) (0.188) (0.081) (0.076)
Immediate Choice -0.065 0.071*** 0.068***
(0.312) (0.023) (0.022)
Tailor Intensity x Immediate 4.537 0.071 0.057
(3.809) (0.133) (0.131)
Constant 0.780* 0.104*** -0.009 0.765 0.067*** -0.018
(0.457) (0.018) (0.058) (0.482) (0.020) (0.058)
# Vaccinators 280 267 267 280 267 267
Panel B: Tailoring Intensity and Boundary Sample
Dependent variable: |v1,iv2,i − 1|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tailor Intensity 1.200 0.151** 0.124* -0.038 0.054 0.025
(1.006) (0.069) (0.065) (0.127) (0.060) (0.054)
Immediate Choice 0.094 0.066*** 0.064**
(0.202) (0.025) (0.025)
Tailor Intensity x Immediate 2.075 0.148 0.154
(1.848) (0.119) (0.114)
Constant 0.712* 0.152*** 0.044 0.652* 0.119*** 0.016
(0.368) (0.026) (0.065) (0.369) (0.026) (0.063)
# Vaccinators 337 320 320 337 320 320
Stratum FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude 99th and 1st Percentiles No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Drive 2 R No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the effects of tailoring on the equality of effort provision over time. The measure
| vtvt+1 − 1| reflects the distance of the task allocation (v1,v2) from equality (v1 = v2). Column (1) reports a
regression of this measure on an indicator equal to one for subjects in the tailored group. Column (2) reports
estimates from the same specification excluding outliers. Column (3) controls for the interest rate assignment in
round 2. Column (4) provides estimates on the same sample as column (1) interacting treatment with being in the
immediate choice condition. Columns (5) and (6) apply the same restrictions to the sample as columns (2) and
(3) respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust White standard errors reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
report*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
